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This study examined performance outcome data from the Medicare Compare
Hospital database for differences in performance between national award-winning
hospitals and non-national award-winning hospitals. Specific variables examined were
related to clinical care and were identified in literature as well as professional medical
associations and societies as being quality indicators. National award-winning hospitals
were defined as those having received the Malcolm Baldrige Quality Award in
Healthcare or the Healthgrades Distinguished Hospital for Clinical Excellence. The
characteristics of highly reliable organizations were also used to align the indicators of
excellence for Malcolm Baldrige and Healthgrades recipients. Finally, a closer
examination of data from three high-risk departments—Obstetrics Units, Emergency
Departments and Operating Departments—within hospitals that had received national
quality awards and those that had not was conducted to see if there was a difference in
performance in high-risk areas. Through quantitative analysis, findings indicate overall
that those hospitals receiving a national quality award performed better in more variables
than those hospitals that have not received a national quality award. Contributions of this
work lie in the alignment of national awards to the characteristics of highly reliable

organizations and more concrete analysis on performance for hospitals to review as their
journey toward quality and patient safety continues.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Background
Healthcare is a high-risk industry, which means that its fundamental core work is
subject to potential dangers or hazards that can at times result in a high probability of
error; this high error rate poses great risks to organizations and their employees, as well
as to their patients. The Institute of Medicine’s (IOM) original report To Err is Human, as
well as subsequent follow up reports in 2005 and 2009, indicates that patient safety and
quality continues to be a problem within the healthcare industry in the United States
(Clancy, 2009; Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 1999; Leape & Berwick, 2005). One in
three patients still experiences adverse events during the course of their hospital stay
(Classen et al., 2011).
The complexities of healthcare systems result in the fact that hospitals are prone
to errors. Pham et al. (2012) define medical error as “a preventable adverse event or near
miss due to the failure of a planned action to be completed as intended or use of a wrong
plan to achieve an aim” (p. 448). Some of the most common medical errors include
medication errors such as wrong medication or wrong dosage; hospital-acquired
infections such as surgical site, bacteria, or any other infection that was not incubating
before admission to the hospital; teamwork and safety culture, for example, lack of
implementing error reporting measures or lack of team training; patient falls; hand-off
errors such as between shift changes or between department transfers; diagnostic errors
1
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such as misdiagnosis; and surgical errors—wrong sided surgery, wrong patient, foreign
materials left in patient, for example (Pham et al., 2012). The estimated annual cost of
medical errors in 2008 was $17.1 billion (Van Den Bos et al., 2011).
However, this figure may not accurately reflect the real economic costs of these
medical errors. Studies by Classen et al. (2011) indicate that 90% of adverse events are
missed in conventional reporting and are not reflected in patient safety indicators that
healthcare facilities typically utilize to gauge medical errors. Classen et al.’s study
examined the most popular patient safety tracking systems used in the United States
(voluntary reporting and the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality’s [AHRQ]
Patient Safety Indicators) and compared them to the Institute for Healthcare
Improvement’s Global Trigger Tool. The study’s findings indicate that the two most
popular methods used by most healthcare delivery organizations and supported by policy
makers to measure safety of care is voluntary reporting and AHRQ’s Patient Safety
Indicators. They may fail to detect 90% of adverse events that occur among hospitalized
patients (Classen et al., 2011). And this is one of the reason why medical errors are not
always easy to recognize, especially when the effects of some adverse event suffered by
the patient are not long-lasting. For example, in the need of a healthcare team to manage
a patient’s pain, two pain medications are administered too close together and the patient
becomes unresponsive and begins to show signs of respiratory failure. The patient does
not go into complete failure and within a day becomes responsive again.
Because they do not recognize this situation as an error, the healthcare team in
this hypothetical example may not report this error. Yet another reason that it is difficult
to identify medical errors is that patients are in hospitals because they are ill and are

3
already in compromised health. Differentiating between the disease process and a
medical error can be very difficult. Take the same example of the medication error above,
and now introduce the fact that the patient has pneumonia. This patient’s respiratory rate
may appear to be compromised from a disease process and may not be readily
attributable to the mismanaged timing of pain medication, and thus, the incident is not
reported. There is difficulty in establishing clear indices for the actual number of adverse
events that occur. Classen et al.’s (2011) study used a broader definition of adverse event:
“unintended physical injury resulting from or contributed to by medical care that requires
additional monitoring, treatment, or hospitalization, or results in death” (p. 583). This
definition also did not require the harm to have been preventable or indicate that the
event led to a major disability. Given the omission of these categories, it is clear that the
number of deaths due to medical error may be 10 times greater than previously reported
by the IOM (Classen et al., 2011).
Data from the 1999 IOM report (Kohn, Corrigan & Donaldson, 1999) came from
two studies, one conducted in 1984 in New York and the other conducted in 1992 in Utah
and Colorado, which found that hospitalized patients experienced adverse events, defined
as injuries caused by medical management, at a rate of 2.9% and 3.7%, respectively.
These percentages were extrapolated over the 33.6 million admissions to U.S. hospitals
which leads to the 44,000–98,000 deaths due to medical error cited in the report (Kohn et
al., 1999). The Classen et al. (2011) study identified the difficulty with the current most
common methods to accurately report adverse events in hospitals. Therefore, it is
reasonable that the studies cited in the IOM report also reflected difficulty in identifying
clear adverse events and rates could be higher than originally reported.
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Cost of Medical Errors
This means that the cost of medical errors to the U.S. economy in 2008 may have
been as high as $980 billion per year, when calculating both medical expenses and
quality-adjusted life years (Andel, Davidow, Hollander, & Moreno, 2012), a far cry from
the $17.1 billion figure indicated in the Van Den Bos et al. (2011) study. Quality-adjusted
life year estimation modeling is not a precise science: depending on the method used to
determine utility values for the calculation of quality-adjusted life years, very different
cost utility ratios can be generated (Marra et al., 2007). Yet, while difficult to measure
because the value of an individual life is not exact, it is clear that such indicators must be
considered when factoring economic impact (Andel et al., 2012). There is a correlative
relationship between medical errors and the degree to which patients win legal lawsuits.
A study conducted by Studdert et al. (2006) reviewed a random sample of malpractice
claims from five liability insurers. The study searched for whether a medical injury had
occurred and if so, whether it was due to error. In addition the study analyzed claims that
lacked evidence of error. It was found that most claims that were not associated with
errors or injuries did not receive compensation and when they did receive compensation
it was significantly lower than claims that did involve injuries that were due to medical
errors. Overall the study found that claims that lack evidence of medical error were not
uncommon; however, most of those were denied compensation. The real expense comes
from claims that involved injuries due to errors (Studdert et al., 2006). Therefore, costs
associated with legal lawsuits are relevant to factor in as a contributing cost of medical
errors. With the burden of costs associated with medical errors being shouldered by the
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U.S. economy, it is reasonable to use this factor as support for the research questions in
this study.
Type of Medical Errors
The circumstances surrounding the type, kind, and degree of medical errors begs
the question regarding specific departments within the hospital setting where these errors
occur most frequently, as well as the actual correlative expenses. According to the 2013
Annual Report of the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB, 2014b), 76,839 medical
malpractice reports and adverse action reports were filed in the United States. Diagnosisrelated and treatment-related cases had 2,026 claims payments during 2012. Surgeryrelated, anesthesia-related and intravenous (IV) and blood products-related cases had
5,452 claims payments, and obstetrics-related cases had 585 claims payments.
Malpractice award payments in 2012 for diagnosis and treatment-related cases averaged
$337,892 per payment. In 2012, the malpractice award payment for surgery/anesthesia
and IV-blood-related cases averaged $299,337 per payment, while the average
malpractice award payment for obstetrics-related cases was $572,199, highlighting the
fact that obstetrics errors occur much less frequently than errors in other departments
such as surgical errors, but when they do occur, they are more costly in terms of
compensation (NPDB Annual Report, 2014b). The number of medical errors and the
costs associated with those errors has resulted in increased healthcare costs that both
organizations and patients must bear.
Factors Contributing to Medical Errors
Some of the factors that contribute to medical errors concern a lack of
communication and cooperation among healthcare professionals; lapses in judgment; and
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individual variations and an over-reliance on the knowledge, skills, and individual
interpretation of humans as the basic safety mechanism, rather than the use of clearly
delineated standard operating procedures that would reduce individual variation (Healey
& McGowan, 2011; Pham et al., 2012; Rogers & Gaba, 2011).
The implementation of checklists, for example, represents a move in the direction
of standardization (Makary, 2012). The use of checklists can provide a foundation for
standard operating procedures that are read aloud and responded to in order to establish a
universal awareness of the patient’s situation, thereby creating a smaller window for
potential error. Similarly, internal systems and processes seem to have evolved over time
as organizations have become bigger and more complex; yet, they are heavily
bureaucratic and entrenched in practices that run counter to quality initiatives, factors,
which continue to contribute to problematic procedural flaws. For example, the timely
and accurate administration of medications currently requires a circuitous pathway that is
not efficient: an order moves from the physician to the RN to the pharmacist to the
pharmacy, and then makes its way back from pharmacy to the unit to the RN so that
medications can be administered (Lanham & Maxson-Cooper, 2003). This process is
unwieldy and inefficient: the simpler, more efficient route is for the physician to
implement the order directly into his or her computer, where the requisition is directly
relayed to the pharmacy for processing, with another direct process in place to route the
medications back to the unit to be administered. However, such direct processing is not
always part of standard practices in many hospitals (Lanham & Maxson-Cooper, 2003).
Consider that the more steps and the more people involved in a process, without
oversight of the incremental elements of the process, the more the opportunity for error to
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occur, rather than the process reflecting a system of checks and balances. Medical errors,
the factors contributing to and the prevention of them, have been the focus of many
scholarly works in an effort to draw critical attention to this problem; however, for the
majority of healthcare organizations, changes have not been successfully implemented to
counteract these deficiencies (Clancy, 2009). Clancy argues that a predominant factor in
not having made greater strides in combating medical errors in the first 10 years of trying
is the fragmented environment in which healthcare is given. She argues that to address
medical errors a hospital must change its culture and systems and improve
communication and teamwork within each individual unit and the hospital as a whole.
But, instead, a number of healthcare systems reward high volume and highly
compensated procedures over preventative care and improving patient outcomes (Clancy,
2009). Thus, it may be that quantity versus quality is reflective of a more profit-driven
philosophy, rather than a humanitarian-based perspective.
Safety Standards and Organizational Culture
In 10 years after the Institute of Medicine (IOM) report article (Clancy, 2009),
Robert Wachter (2010) praised the Joint Commission for its efforts to create safety
standards and enforce them. However, he points out that after the low-hanging fruit is
picked, the Joint Commission role as regulator and accreditor leaves it with almost
useless tools to make progress in complex, nuanced areas. Wachter points to the lack of
patient safety research, patient engagement, healthcare provider leadership, as well as a
rudimentary capacity to measure safety as reasons why more progress has not been made.
As a result, patient safety and well-being are therefore compromised in hospital settings
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that do not reflect recognition of medical errors, as do highly reliable organizations in
which accountability, transparency, and quality inhere within the organizational culture.
Organizational culture has routinely emerged as an important variable necessary
to the successful change in an organization (Latta, 2009). Organizational culture is
defined as “the shared perceptions, patterns of belief, symbols, rites and rituals, and
myths that evolve over time and function as the glue that holds the organization together”
(Akgun, Keskin, & Byrne, 2012, p. 103). The role in the values, beliefs and the
underlying assumptions that members of a particular organization share about appropriate
behavior cannot be overestimated (Akgun et al., 2012). If the culture of a healthcare
organization is not conducive to addressing patient safety issues, then attempts to
redesign systems and ensure sustainability of changes becomes challenging at best, if not
impossible (Provonost et al., 2006). Culture defines the quality and safety of any
workplace, including medicine (Makary, 2012). Changing the healthcare culture from
command and control to one of continuous improvement is the goal for the successful
implementation of patient safety initiatives (Toussaint & Gerard, 2010). John Toussaint
and Roger Gerard, physicians, as well as authors of On the Mend: Revolutionizing
Healthcare to Save Lives and Transform the Industry (2010), describe the current
management of healthcare as autocratic, top-down and controlling, identifying it as a
command and control management system. They argue that until the management system
changes to one of continuous improvement, patient safety initiatives will be inconsistent
at best.
Yet, despite deficiencies in creating healthcare cultures that espouse total quality
initiatives and to impact medical errors in their organizations, there are hospitals that
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have achieved national quality awards, specifically the Malcolm Baldrige National
Quality Award and Healthgrades Distinguished Hospital Award for Clinical Excellence,
and arguably these hospitals may be described as highly reliable organizations. The
concept of inculcating quality into the national American landscape heralded the advent
of the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award, which was established by Congress in
1987 to enhance the competitiveness of American businesses within the global market,
and included healthcare in 1999. These national award-winning hospitals have shown
dedication to the implementation of quality and safety objectives with measureable
outcomes: these outcomes are continuously evaluated, measured and assessed and then
subjected to continuous process improvement (Malcolm Baldrige, 2013a). This cycle,
then, becomes part of an ongoing process, grounded in the philosophical premise that
processes can and should always be improved. This philosophical premise is an example
of the type of culture that is necessary for achieving greater safety and quality and
reducing errors, which is why winners of the Malcolm Baldrige Award and the
Distinguished Hospital for Clinical Excellence Award for hospitals have been selected
for the purposes of this study.
Not surprising for those that study the field of public affairs and administration,
there has been a long and continued governmental awareness of providing and preserving
U.S. citizens’ healthcare and to sustain well-being. This awareness started in 1798, with
the Act for the Relief of Sick and Disabled Seamen; however, until recently,
governmental involvement was focused upon the identification of populations of people
who could gain access to healthcare or for the purposes of studying diseases, or to
determine the safety of medications, but not necessarily focused on the assurance of
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quality and safety in the hospital (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
[DHHS], 2014).
Problem Statement
Individuals who require medical interventions may find themselves “at greater or
significantly greater risk” at hospitals that have disconnect between the intention to
promote safety and their actual safety rates. Current research indicates upwards of
440,000 people die each year due to medical errors, and can cost as much as $980 billion
to the U.S. economy (Andel et al., 2012; James, 2013). That is equivalent to nearly three
Boeing 747 aircraft crashing every day for an entire year. Hospitals can remain
unenlightened about both the potential harm, as well as the potential medical advances
that can emerge when shifts in cultural philosophy inspire purposeful quality changes.
Improvements in patient safety, and the reduction of errors, depend on overcoming
organizational culture barriers that impede the implementation of quality improvement
strategies. For public administrators and government policy makers understanding
medical errors and quality in healthcare is critical to the well-being of the citizens and the
health of the financial structure of the economy. It is imperative, therefore, to study
national quality award-winning models and the outcomes wrought by following quality
initiatives and compare them to non-national quality award-winning models.
Purpose Statement and Research Questions
Although logic suggests hospitals receiving national quality awards have lower
levels of medical errors and better performance on quality indicators, and are worth the
cost in resources to obtain or publicize these awards, the literature does not indicate
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whether this is the case. This project will examine the differences between national
quality award-winning hospitals’ quality outcomes as compared to the outcomes of nonnational quality award-winning hospitals. It will establish differences, if any, in three
high-risk departments (OB-GYN; Operating Department, and Emergency Department) of
these hospitals. It will examine specific variables collected by the Medicare Hospital
Compare database for the approximately 4,000 hospitals in the United States listed in the
database. Hospitals with missing data for half or more of the specific variables will be
excluded from the analysis. All hospitals will offer Emergency Department (ED),
Obstetrics Department (OB-GYN), and Operating Department (OD) services and will be
Acute Care Centers. The Malcolm Baldrige Quality Award-Winning hospitals and the
Healthgrades Distinguished Hospital for Clinical Excellence Award from 2012, 2013,
and 2014 will be identified as national quality award winners. The remaining hospitals
will be identified as non-national quality award winners.
This project is guided by four research questions:
1. Do hospitals that have won national quality awards (Malcolm Baldrige and/or
Distinguished Clinical Excellence Award) have higher scores in key quality
performance variables (clinical excellence) than non-national award-winning
hospitals?
2. Do Obstetric Departments in hospitals that have won national quality awards
(Malcolm Baldrige and/or Distinguished Clinical Excellence Award) have
higher scores in key quality performance variables (clinical excellence) than
Obstetric Departments in non-national award-winning hospitals?
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3. Do Operating Departments in hospitals that have won national quality awards
(Malcolm Baldrige and/or Distinguished Clinical Excellence Award) have
higher scores in key quality performance variables (clinical excellence) than
Operating Departments in non-national award-winning hospitals?
4. Do Emergency Departments in hospitals that have won national quality
awards (Malcolm Baldrige and/or Distinguished Clinical Excellence Award)
have higher scores in key quality performance variables (clinical excellence)
than Emergency Departments in non-national award-winning hospitals?
Significance
This study seeks to contribute information that healthcare organizations can
utilize to facilitate, sustain, and foster the adoption of a wider array of quality
measurements and error improvements in their organizations. It also seeks to contribute
information to the field of public affairs and administration in providing a possible
strategy of science to research quality in healthcare. It will do so by understanding if
hospitals that have received these specific national quality awards perform at a higher
level of quality in specific quality variables than hospitals that have not received these
awards. In addition, the study will hold major benefits for diverse constituencies:
1. Positive findings from this study could be utilized by hospitals to foster and
sustain an organizational culture that enhances quality within their
organizations, an action which will positively impact patient care and safety.
Dr. Marty Makary, a specialist at Johns Hopkins Hospital and professor at
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health is regarded as an
international expert in patient safety and an advocate for transparency in
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healthcare. Makary makes a distinction between hospitals dedicated to quality
improvements through best practices in medicine and transparency, and those
hospitals that ignore the danger signs that signal untoward practices which
place patients in jeopardy (Makary, 2012).
2. Findings can also provide information to public administrators, policy makers,
hospital administrators and unit decision makers, influencing the types of
policies that can be implemented to drive quality initiatives and evaluate
quality results. In 2008, a policy developed by the Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services limited payment to hospitals for treating costly and
avoidable conditions that were acquired during the patient’s in-hospital stay.
This policy represented the first national government effort to tie
reimbursement directly to performance, and it heralds a new philosophy of
accountability (McHugh, Martin, Orwat, & Van Dyke, 2011). This policy was
expanded under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, which
indicates that federal payments to treat hospital-acquired conditions are
prohibited. Furthermore, starting in 2015, the Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services will reduce payments by 1% for hospitals that are in the
top quartile of hospital-acquired illnesses and conditions and will publicly
post the rates of those conditions on their website (McHugh et al., 2011).
Hospitals should be motivated to address these negative conditions out of
concern for human well-being; however, if they are not motivated out of
compassion and caring, then they will certainly be motivated by the financial
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constraints placed upon them: in essence, penalties and liabilities for medical
errors. The need is to address these issues, not conceal them.
Methods Overview
This study utilized a quantitative approach and conduct a two sample t test
analysis to examine the differences between hospitals that have received national quality
awards and their clinical performance outcomes versus non-national quality awardwinning hospitals and their clinical performance outcomes. The two sample t test was
used because the data collected are in a continuous variable format that allows for the
comparison of means. Data from the open source Medicare Hospital Compare database
was collected for all hospitals across the United States. National quality award-winning
hospitals are defined as those that have received either the Malcolm Baldrige National
Quality Award or the Healthgrades Distinguished Hospital for Clinical Excellence Award
in 2012, 2013, or 2014. Hospitals not receiving either of these two awards were
categorized as non-national quality award-winning.
Variables from the Medicare Hospital Compare database were refined to include
only key variables in clinical quality. The refinement process examined empirical
research in the literature as well as national professional medical organizations and
societies that have identified quality indicators as their focus. The researcher used
empirical evidence and focus of national medical organizations to categorize variables
into OB-GYN variables, ED variables, and OD variables. Data analysis could be run on
multiple levels to understand the overall association between national quality awardwinning hospitals and non-national quality award-winning hospitals. Data analysis could
also be run on the clinical outcome variables of those high-risk departments.
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Definitions
Adverse Event – unintended physical injury resulting from or contributing to by
medical care that requires additional monitoring, treatment, or hospitalization, or results
in death (Classen et al., 2013).
AHRQ – Agency for Healthcare Research & Quality is the health services
research arm of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, providing a major
source of funding and technical assistance for health service research and training at U.S.
universities and other institutions (AHRQ, 2014a).
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services – U.S. federal government programs
providing health insurance to the elderly and indigent citizens of the U.S (Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2014a).
Cost of Medical Errors – the U.S. dollar amount expended on medical services,
follow-up care and quality adjusted life years on patients that have experienced a medical
error in the healthcare industry.
Distinguished Hospital Award for Clinical Excellence – a national quality award
recognizing the top 5% hospitals for overall clinical excellence based on risk-adjusted
mortality and complication rates calculated by Healthgrades (2013a).
Global Trigger Tool – the Institute for Healthcare Improvement’s tool for
measuring adverse events that uses reviewers conducting retrospective reviews of patient
records (Institute for Healthcare Improvement, 2014).
Healthgrades – a U.S. company providing healthcare consumers with information
needed to make more informed decisions including information about the provider’s
experience, patient satisfaction and hospital quality (Healthgrades, 2014).
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High-risk industry – an organization which has fundamental core work that is
subject to potential dangers or hazards that at times can have a high probability of error,
posing great risk to the organization, employees, and patients.
Highly Reliable Organization – organizations that exist in hazardous, fast-paced,
highly complex systems that are technically advanced with low occurrence of errors for
long periods of time (Baker, Day, & Sala, 2006; Beyea, 2005; Stock, McFadden, &
Gowen, 2006).
Highly Reliable Organization Theory – a theory that training, learning and
redundancy can lead to high levels of safety and reliability in organizations that are
hazardous, fast-paced, and highly complex (Weick & Sutcliff, 2007).
IOM – Institute of Medicine, a part of the National Academy of Science and is the
health arm, established in 1970 to provide unbiased and authoritative advice to decision
makers and the public on healthcare in the U.S. (IOM, 2014).
Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award – established by Congress in 1987 to
enhance the competitiveness of American businesses within the global market, healthcare
was added in 1999 (Malcolm Baldrige, 2013a).
Medicare Hospital Compare Database – Data collected by the U.S. federal
government on the quality of care at over 4,000 Medicare-certified hospitals across the
country. Data are not risk-adjusted, but are merely reported for consumers to help make
decisions on where to get healthcare and for hospitals to improve the quality of care they
provide (Medicare Hospital Compare, 2014d).
Medical Error – preventable adverse events or near miss due to the failure of a
planned action to be completed as intended or use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim.
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National Practitioner Data Bank – a confidential information clearinghouse
created by Congress with the primary goals of improving healthcare quality, protecting
the public, and reducing healthcare fraud and abuse in the U.S. (NPDB, 2014a).
National Award-Winning Hospital – hospitals having received either the Malcolm
Baldrige Quality Award or the Distinguished Clinical Excellence Award by
Healthgrades.
Non-National Award-Winning Hospital – hospitals that have not received the
Malcolm Baldrige Quality Award or the Distinguished Clinical Excellence Award by
Healthgrades.
Organizational Culture – the shared perceptions, patterns, belief, symbols, rites
and rituals, and myths that evolve over time and function as the glue that holds an
organization together.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act – Act designed to ensure all
Americans have access to quality, affordable healthcare; components include quality,
affordable healthcare, role of public programs in healthcare, improving the quality and
efficiency of healthcare, healthcare work force, transparency and program integrity,
improving access to innovative medical therapies, community living assistance services
and supports, revenue provisions (Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 2014).
Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALY) – a calculation that assumes an average of 10
lost years of life at $75,000 to $100,000 per year lost in economic impact when
calculating the premature death of a patient (Andel et al., 2012).
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Summary
Medical errors in the United States continue to be a problem. This project seeks to
understand the association between national quality award-winning hospitals and their
performance on key quality outcome variables as they compare to non-national quality
award-winning hospitals. National quality award-winning hospitals are those that have
been awarded either the Malcolm Baldrige Quality Award for Healthcare or the
Distinguished Hospital for Clinical Excellence Award by Healthgrades. Non-national
award-winning hospitals are those that have not received either of these two awards,
however could have received other awards including specialty awards. For purposes of
this study, safety/quality and errors are coupled concepts; if there are high error rates,
there is a lack of quality. Understanding the association regarding these hospitals’
performance on key quality outcome variables will allow patients and consumers of the
U.S. healthcare system better information on choosing where to seek healthcare; in
addition, this information will allow hospitals, public administrators, and policy makers
to see the correlation between national quality awards and key outcome variables in
healthcare quality, which may provide a strategy in how to conduct research on quality in
healthcare. Findings from this study will be submitted for publication in journals and
presented at conferences focusing on medical error and patient safety.

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Organization of the Literature Review
Information in this section will be organized and include the following:
Background
Healthcare and Government
Magnitude of Medical Errors
Types of Medical Errors and Where They Occur
Three High-Risk Departments: A Profile
Categories of Medical Errors & Frequency – Errors that directly and indirectly
result in adverse events
Overall Cost of Medical Errors
Legal Cost of Medical Errors
Mechanisms to Address Errors
Characteristics of Highly Reliable Organizations
Cultures of Reliable Organizations
Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award
Healthgrades Distinguished Hospital Clinical Excellence Award
Medicare Hospital Compare Quality of Care Database
Summary
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Background
Chapter I clearly delineates the complexity of medical errors in hospitals in the
United States. Medical errors not only compromise patient safety and well-being, but also
impede hospitals’ ability to deliver quality care in a safe environment. Further, medical
errors cost hospitals their reputations and also result in law suits and cost settlements that
pose substantial financial burdens. Hospitals that fail to measure the frequency and
severity of medical errors fail to estimate these losses; in other words, they do not assess
risk and continue to conduct business without cognizance of the true consequences—the
loss of life and patient safety, the loss of financial solidity, and the loss of reputation of
quality that may also impact professional staff.
Medical errors are described in the literature in a one-dimensional model which
fails to take into account that these adverse events far too frequently occur in multiple
dimensions. In other words, medical errors can be compounded, occurring within a
complex of errors. It is therefore difficult to account for exact costs within such a
compounded framework; nevertheless, it is not difficult to appreciate the spiraling
financial costs that evolve out of this complexity. Initiatives to operate more efficiently
often gird many industries which appreciate quality principles guided by assessment and
evaluation, continuous process improvement, and transparency of data. These approaches
not only permit the problems or difficulties to emerge, but also measure the outcomes of
amelioratives. These organizations, often referred to as “highly reliable organizations”
(HROs), pave the way for other like-minded organizations that aspire to these quality
ends.
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This research explored whether the target population of U.S. hospitals has
differing outcome performance measures in clinical excellence based on whether specific
national quality awards have been received. The literature supports the concept that
pockets of quality can inhere in institutions and organizations; therefore, this study will
also assess three high-risk hospital departments that typically hold the most potential for
costly medical errors. These departments, the OB-GYN, OD, and ED, will be examined
to determine clinical outcome performance compared with the general hospital profile.
Healthcare and Government
In 1798, the Act for the Relief of Sick and Disabled Seamen marked the
beginning of federal involvement in healthcare; however, until recently, the involvement
was focused upon the identification of populations of people who could gain access to
healthcare or for the purposes of studying diseases, or to determine the safety of
medications, but not necessarily focused on the assurance of quality and safety in the
hospital (U.S. DHHS, 2014). There were three major areas of legislation in healthcare,
the first being research, which began in 1887 when the federal government opened a oneroom laboratory for research on disease (U.S. DHHS, 2014). The second area of
legislation in healthcare was concerned with overseeing and monitoring access to
healthcare. This initiative began in 1920 with the Snyder Act, which concerned itself with
authorizing government funding for healthcare access for Native Americans and was the
first time the government developed a broad Native American healthcare policy (Nelson,
2010).
Patient safety and quality of care represents the third area of concern and it started
in 1999 with the renaming of previous legislation to the Agency for Healthcare Research
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and Quality, which was tasked with the improvement of quality, safety efficiency and
effectiveness of healthcare (AHRQ, 2014a). This initiative was followed in 2005 by the
start of the congressional movement towards safety: the Patient Safety and Quality
Improvement Act established certified patient safety organizations tasked with collecting
voluntary error and near miss reports in healthcare. In addition, it also provided
protections for those healthcare professionals reporting errors or near-miss information
(U.S. DHHS, 2014).
The most recent legislation, the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
was a combination of access to healthcare care and quality improvement of healthcare. It
focused on mandating insurance coverage for all people, but it also included a number of
programs and agencies developed for improving quality and performance as well as
prevention and wellness (U.S. DHHS, 2014).
Magnitude of Medical Errors
The Institute of Medicine’s (IOM) report in 1999 (Kohn, Corrigan & Donaldson,
1999), which stated that upwards of 98,000 people die each year due to preventable
medical errors, is indicative of a concerning trend that existed prior to 1999. The IOM
report is significant in that it is one of the first official reports that captured the reality of
medical errors. The report provided insight into medical errors that essentially have been
shrouded amidst bureaucratic practices that prevent transparency, and thus, compromise
patient safety (Kohn et al., 1999). Until the IOM report in 1999, information regarding
the severity of the problem was limited to academic literature, making this report a
landmark.
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In 2008, to the question, “How much of a problem is patient safety?” Dr. Lucian
Leape responded, “The unsettling fact is that no one knows” (Consumers Union, 2009).
Dr. Leape’s observation that no one knows the severity of the problem of medical errors
may well be true. According to the IOM report, there is no national system of
accountability through the concept of transparency, and there is no national tracking unit
that coordinates patient safety efforts (Kohn et al., 1999).
Thus, the estimated numbers of errors and their impact on patients may be low.
The IOM report contained data collected from review of medical records in 1984 and
extrapolated an estimate of 98,000 deaths due to medical errors each year (James, 2013).
However current research, using data published in studies from 2008–2011, shows the
number of deaths due to medical error is estimated at upwards of 400,000 each year
(James, 2013). Empirical evidence of medical errors within the hospital setting is not
always transparent, a fact that may deter identification and amelioration of adverse
advents. Hospitals may fear reprisals if they publish data on medical errors: federal
penalties, loss of reputation of quality, and loss of consumer confidence are three such
examples. However, concealing such information may not hold a benefit, as medical
researchers such as Marty Makary (2012) and others indicate. Research examining
communication and resolution programs or disclosure, apology, and offer programs in
healthcare indicate that these types of transparency programs that disclose medical errors
to patients, apologize for them, and offer compensation are viewed by healthcare
stakeholders as having a great potential to improve medical liability and patient safety,
even more so than healthcare tort reform options (Bell et al., 2012; Sage et al., 2014).
Existing are conversations in the field that concern the manner in which the phenomenon
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of medical errors and adverse events can and should be reduced or eliminated in an effort
to ensure a quality culture of best practices through which patient safety is sustained.
Existing also are hospitals of merit which are quality award-winning hospitals that have
striven toward patient safety goals and have attained recognition as highly reliable
organizations dedicated to best practices through transparency. Highly reliable
organizations are advocates of these same quality principles of transparency, continuous
process improvement, and tracking, affected through organizational cultures aligned with
these goals.
Types of Medical Errors and Where They Occur
Pham et al. (2012) define medical error as “a preventable adverse event or near
miss due to the failure of a planned action to be completed as intended or use of a wrong
plan to achieve an aim” (p. 448). An adverse event is then defined as “an unintended
patient harm caused by medical management rather than by a disease process, which
results in a prolonged hospital stay, morbidity, or mortality” (p. 448). In other words,
medical errors result, in part, from untoward medical practices that reflect complex
interconnections between process and procedure, in addition to simple human error. The
genesis for the pantheon of medical errors is wide and broad. The element of
responsibility figures prominently in this regard because these elements are preventable,
unlike disease processes which generally are not always. However, there are significant
numbers of medical errors which occur annually and which draw concern from hospital
administrators, physicians, nurses, and other healthcare providers.
These medical errors span across a spectrum of various types and kinds, some of
which occur due to human error, carelessness, lack of cohesion among medical team
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members, among others. Errors can emerge from systemic issues, as well as the
challenged health of healthcare providers themselves, as typified in the 1984 Libby Zion
case where emergency room doctors, exhausted from overly-long shifts in the ER, did not
diagnose the young woman correctly and gave her a medication that resulted in her death.
A New York state investigation as well as a civil trial ensued and addressed several
issues surrounding the woman’s death: long resident and intern working hours
contributing to fatigue, medication errors, and use of restraints to combat the untoward
effects of the prescribed medication, which eventually led to her death. The law suit
resulted in the Libby Zion Law, which limits the number of hours that a New York
resident physician can work to 80 hours per week to combat fatigue (Lerner, 2006).
Medication errors are just one facet of the larger picture of medical errors. Some
of the most common medical errors include medication errors such as wrong medication
or wrong dosage; hospital-acquired infections such as surgical site, bacteria, or any other
infection that was not incubating before admission to the hospital; lapses in teamwork
and safety culture such as implementing error reporting measures or lack of team
training; patient falls; patient hand-off errors such as between shift changes or between
department transfers; diagnostic errors such as misdiagnosis; surgical errors such as
wrong sided surgery, wrong patient, or foreign materials left in patient (Pham et al.,
2012).
The number of patients injured or killed each year by medical errors reflects only
those that have been reported. Research shows that the reporting of these adverse events
is woefully low (Classen et al., 2011). Classen et al. (2011) evaluated three adverse
events/error reporting methods. They included a hospital’s voluntary reporting system,
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the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality’s Patient Safety Indicators, and the
Institute for Healthcare Improvements Global Trigger Tool. The study examined the
ability of these reporting methods to detect the rate of adverse events in three leading
hospitals which are deeply invested in advanced patient safety programs and quality. The
findings show that the two methods most commonly used by most healthcare facilities to
measure safety of care are voluntary reporting systems and the Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality’s Patient Safety Indicators. Yet, according to Classen et al.’s study,
these two most commonly used reporting systems detect approximately only 10% of the
events that actually occur. Reasons for failure to detect adverse events in these reporting
systems can be due to differences in definition of adverse event, issues of time/resources
and cost to implement complete systems, fear of litigation, a reluctance to report one’s
own errors, uncertainty of when something is an adverse event, and the lack of change
when reporting does occur (Garrouste-Orgeas et al., 2012; Zeeshan, Dembe, Seiber, &
Lu, 2014). Because of these barriers, Zeeshan, Dembe, Seiber, and Lu (2014) suggest that
the estimates for adverse events are underestimated.
According to Classen et al. (2011), if only 10% of adverse events are consistently
captured, the IOM’s report of 98,000 deaths annually and the National Healthcare Quality
Report (NHQR, 2013) estimate of 3,023,000 injuries are low. The Classen et al. study
reveals that in actuality annual deaths due to medical error may be 10 times that number.
Newer research from James (2013), who conducted a meta-analysis of four studies
between 2008-2011, now indicates that the number of premature deaths associated with
medical errors is at a lower limit of 210,000 and may be as high as 440,000 per year.
James’ newer data also indicate that medical errors which lead to serious harm seem to be
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10- to 20-fold more common than lethal harm. In James’ meta-analysis study, serious
harm included the following: required prolonged hospital stay, permanent harm, and life
sustaining intervention being required.
Three High-Risk Departments: A Profile
Anecdotal evidence from Baker et al. (2006) suggests the elements of highly
reliable organizations are not uniformly distributed through a hospital and not all hospital
settings necessarily carry with them an explicit risk. However, some hospital settings do.
The National Practitioner Database data indicate that the three highest risk/most-loss
departments within a hospital are the Obstetrics Unit (OB-GYN), the Emergency
Department (ED), and the Operating Department (OD) (NPDB, 2014b). Table 1
illustrates the number of payments and the mean payout of claims in 2012 for these three
areas, as well as other areas for comparison. These data show that these three departments
are where most malpractice claims are filed and where most payments are made. They
are not necessarily where the most frequent errors occur: medication errors and hospitalacquired infections are the largest offenders, but cannot be attributed to any one
department. However, when errors in these three areas do occur, they are more expensive
than just additional medical costs, as the average payout on malpractice claims is high.
For example, in 2012 there were 5,152 surgical-anesthesia-IV-blood related malpractice
claims filed with an average payment of $299,337 per claim. While the surgical related
errors do not come close in terms of frequency to hospital-acquired infections which
average about 2 million each year, they are very costly for a hospital to absorb.
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Table 1
Number of Payments and Mean Payout of Medical Malpractice Claims in 2012

Department

Number of Payments in 2012

Mean Payment in 2012

585

$572,199

Emergency Depta

2026

$337,892

Operating Deptb

5452

$299,337

Monitoring-related

323

$293,769

Behavioral Health-related

222

$278,249

Equipment/Product-related

49

$160,323

Other

26

$282,567

Obstetrics Dept

Note. This is not an exhaustive list of errors, but a sample of claims filed.
a
Emergency Department includes Diagnosis-related cases and Treatment-related cases.
b
Operating Department includes Surgery-related cases; Anesthesia-related cases; IV & Blood
Products-related.

For the purposes of the support in the selection of OB-GYN, OD, and ED as a
focus for this study, adverse events and costs related to each areas were consolidated to
provide a more realistic picture of the number of adverse events and costs for those
departments. For example, diagnosis-related cases, meaning misdiagnosed cases that led
to claims, and treatment-related cases, meaning cases where there was an error in
treatment that led to claims, were combined to make up the Emergency Department
cases. While not all diagnosis and treatment related claims can necessarily be attributed
to Emergency Departments, Mark Graber, founding president of the Society to Improve
Diagnosis in Medicine, argues that the Emergency Department is a “petri dish” for
diagnostic mistakes, which is why for purposes of this project they are attributed to the
Emergency Department (Boodman, 2013). Misdiagnosis has continually been
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problematic for the healthcare industry and is the hidden part of the iceberg of medical
errors (Boodman, 2013).
Along the same principle, it stands to reason that the Operating Department
includes cases identified as surgery-related, anesthesia-related, and IV intravenous and
blood products related, since these are correlative. Operating Departments are not the
only place in hospital settings that IV and blood product related errors can occur;
however, patients in the OR will have IV placement and blood products, therefore it is
reasonable to place IV and blood product related errors into the Operating Department
area. Therefore, cases of wrong site surgery or errors in anesthesia medications or wrong
type blood given are combined to represent the Operating Department claims. While
other studies have not necessarily grouped Operating Department claims this way, this
project will based on the reasonability that surgery-related, anesthesia-related and IV and
blood product related claims mainly occur in the Operating Department. The estimated
surgical mortality is 21 out of every 1,000 surgical procedures (not necessarily attributed
to medical error); with almost 100 million surgical procedures performed annually in the
U.S. there are roughly 1,000,000 patients that will die within 30 days of surgery (Lyons
& Popejoy, 2014).
Finally, obstetrics joins the triumvirate of high-risk fields. More than four million
women give birth each year in the United States, making delivery the most common
reason for hospitalization (Callaghan, Creanga, & Kuklina, 2012). The Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC, 2014b) define severe maternal morbidity as the
most severe complications in pregnancy, both physical and psychological, that cause
adverse effects on a woman’s health (CDC, 2014b). Studies of obstetrical adverse events

30
have shown that upwards of 78% of cases had communication error as a factor that led to
the event (Shannon, 2011). The NPDB data reveal that when obstetrics claims do occur,
they are very expensive. The average award in a successful lawsuit involving a
neurologically impaired infant is $1,150,687 (Shwayder, 2007). The CDC suggests that
the rise of severe maternal morbidity is due to a number of factors, including increases in
maternal age, pre-pregnancy obesity, pre-existing chronic medical conditions, and
cesarean delivery (CDC, 2014b).
Whether the medical errors are happening in Obstetrics, the Emergency
Department, or Operating Department, they are costly in every way imaginable. Data
from Van Den Bos et al. (2011) study show that medical errors do not necessarily result
from particularly complex medical procedures or the use of elaborate medical
technology. Instead they are caused by common and relatively straightforward medical
services.
The National Patient Safety Foundation (NPSF) has listed the most common and
most worrisome medical errors that should have focused attention and research. They
include wrong-site surgery, medication errors, health-care acquired infections, falls,
readmissions, and diagnostic errors (NPSF, 2013). The NPDB data clearly indicate the
necessity and the inherent logic in including the three areas of the Emergency
Department, Operating Department, and Obstetrics as focal areas of research for this
study.
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Categories of Medical Errors and Frequency
With the focus on patient safety and quality and reducing medical errors, hospitals
logically may look to the frequency and severity of costs of certain medical errors as the
first areas to aim improvement strategies. Table 2 indicates the frequency and severity of
medical costs for the top medical errors as well as the frequency of malpractice claims
and average cost of malpractice payment (AHRQ, 2013; Boodman, 2013; Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services [CMS], 2014c; NPSF, 2013; NPDB, 2014b; Pham et al.,
2012). From this table it is easy to identify the frequency of errors, the severity of
medical costs, and the additional costs of malpractice settlements, supporting the
municipal finance framework for risk management that indicates organizations should
start with the errors that occur most and/or cost the most and then move in a logic order
from there. We can see that surgical errors, obstetric errors, and diagnostic/treatment
errors do not occur as frequently as medication errors, hospital-acquired infections, or
falls, but when they do occur, they are very expensive in legal ramifications, not
including follow-up medical costs.
Errors That Directly Result in Adverse Events
Medication errors. According to the IOM, there may be 1.5 million preventable
medication errors annually, making this type of error one of the most common and most
costly of preventable errors at a rate of $3.5 billion annually (Pham et al., 2012). Even if
based on the number of medications dispensed each year, this is a relatively low error
rate. The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality considers medication errors
completely preventable and is listed as one of the errors that should never happen
(AHRQ, 2014b).
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Medication errors include administering the wrong drug, the right drug but the
wrong dosage, or administering the right drug but one which results in a harmful drug
interaction, as in the Libby Zion case. Some studies include the delay of receiving
medication as part of the definition of a medication error (Flynn, Liang, Dickson, Xie, &
Suh, 2012). All of these facets together fall into the classification of preventable
medication errors.

Table 2
Frequency and Cost of Medical Errors
Error

Frequency

Medical Cost

Medication
Error

1.5 million

$3.5 billion

$2,333

511

2 million

$11 billion

$5,500

500,000

$30 billion

$60,000

80,000

–

4,108

$1.5 billion

10,398

–

HospitalAcquired
Infections
Falls
Diagnostic and
Treatment
Errors
Surgical
Errors
Obstetrics
Errors

Average
Frequency of
Average
Medical Cost Malpractice Payment of
Claims
Malpractice
Claim

–

$365,141

Total
Malpractice
Claims

$246,756

$126 million

–

–

–

–

–

–

2026

$337,892

$684 million

2893

$205,203

$837 million

585

$572,199

$334 million

Note. “–” refers to data not reported.

Hospital-acquired infections. Hospital-acquired infections are ones that are not
present or incubating at the time of patient admission but are contracted while the patient
is hospitalized. Examples include urinary tract infections, surgical site infections, and
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blood stream infections. Results of these infections can include death and at the very least
result in the expenditure of additional resources, extended care, and substantial financial
cost (Pham et al., 2012).
Prevalence of falls. Falls are the largest single category of adverse events that are
reported in hospitals in the United States. According to the National Patient Safety
Foundation, researchers estimate there are more than 500,000 falls in hospitals each year
(NPSF, 2013).
Diagnostic errors. Diagnostic errors account for approximately 80,000 deaths
each year in the United States. Studies dealing with autopsy have shown that 5% of
patients with clinical misdiagnoses may have avoided death if the correct diagnosis had
been made (Boodman, 2013). Studies show that diagnoses that are delayed, missed, or
incorrect affect 10% to 20% of cases, and a 2009 report funded by the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality found that 28% of diagnostic mistakes reported
anonymously by physicians were life-threatening or resulted in death or permanent
disability. In other words, diagnostic errors from all of healthcare (primary physician
offices to hospitals) occur often and with severe consequences (Boodman, 2013).
Surgical errors. The median overall adverse event rate per hospital is 9.2%. Of
that, surgical adverse events make up 39% (deVries, Ramrattan, Smorenburg, Gouma, &
Boermeester, 2008). Many of the surgical errors can be linked to communication failures,
lack of competence/experience, interruptions, excessive workload, errors in judgment, a
failure to detect a hazard, lack of supervision for trainees, and emergent surgeries (Pham
et al., 2012). Examples of surgical errors include wrong-site surgery, which is defined as
a surgical procedure that is performed on the wrong side, site, limb, body part or wrong
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patient; and retained foreign objects, an error which occurs when an instrument or foreign
body is left inside the patient after surgery (Pham et al., 2012). According to a report by
Wu and Aufses (2012), the Joint Commission estimates there is a national incidence rate
of wrong site surgery as high as 40 per week. Lyons and Popejoy (2014) indicate there
are 100 million surgical procedures conducted annually in the United States. Assuming
the national incidence rate of wrong site surgery is 40 per week, calculated out that is
2,080 per year, which works out to be a rare occurrence, but is the number one concern of
65% of Operating Department nurses across the United States (Infection Control Today,
2013).
Errors that Indirectly Result in Adverse Events
Communication and team work errors. Teamwork and communication errors
are commonly cited as causal factors that result in adverse events, and poor teamwork has
been linked with an increased risk of complications and death in surgical patients (Pham
et al., 2012). Research has shown that the operating room is one of the most common
locations for medical errors and adverse events to happen, with the most commonly cited
cause of surgical error being a breakdown in communication (Lyons & Popejoy, 2014).
For example, surgical procedures are complex and are sometimes conducted in less than
ideal conditions. With approximately one half to two thirds of all errors being attributed
to surgical care, the World Health Organization developed the surgical safety checklist.
This checklist helps both teamwork and communication in that they provide a visual tool
for standardizing communication. It also provides a virtual reminder of safety measures
and best practices which can improve compliance. For example, the surgical checklist
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reminds the surgical team to administer an antibiotic within 60 minutes of incision
helping to reduce the incidence of surgical site infections (Lyons & Popejoy, 2014).
Hand-off errors. Hand-off errors or transitions happen when patients move from
one department to another. For example, this type of error occurs when a patient is
transferred from an operating room to intensive care unit or from one healthcare provider
to another during a shift change. Inconsistencies in hand-off processes and procedures
from department to department and provider to provider can cause a breakdown in
critical information. Communication failures have been identified in up to 70% of what
should be sentinel events (Pham et al., 2012). According to the Joint Commission, a
sentinel event is an unexpected occurrence, or risk of occurrence, involving death or
serious physical or psychological injury that signals the need for an immediate response
or investigation (Joint Commission, 2014). According to the Joint Commission, some of
the most common sentinel events from 2013 are wrong patient, wrong-site, wrongprocedure surgeries; delay in treatment; unintended retention of a foreign body; and falls
(Joint Commission, 2014).
Overall Costs of Medical Errors
Getting to the true cost of medical errors in the United States has proven difficult.
The estimated annual cost of medical errors in 2008 was $17.1 billion. Of that, $3.7
billion were errors that Medicare deems as “never events” or what is now being called
seriously reported events, such as wrong-site or wrong person surgery, medication errors,
and falls (Van Den Bos et al., 2011). For a complete list see of these events, see
Appendix A (National Quality Form, 2014a). This number, however, does not include the
nonmedical cost of errors (Van Den Bos et al., 2011). National Practitioner Data Bank
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data provide only the number of malpractice claims filed and paid out but do not take into
consideration additional medical costs. Nonmedical/additional costs include ancillary
services, prescription drug services, inpatient and outpatient care, lost wages, missed
work, and short-term disability claims, which adds up to approximately $1.1 billion
(Andel et al., 2012). According to a study conducted by Andel et al. (2012), if the
quality-adjusted life years (QALY) calculation is applied to the IOM’s report of 98,000
medical errors annually resulting in death, the cost increases to $98 billion annually. That
QALY calculation assumes an average of 10 lost years of life at $75,000 to $100,000 per
year in lost economic impact. However, if the study by Classen et al. (2011) is correct in
indicating that preventable death is 10 times the figure originally reported by the IOM,
then the cost of medical errors is upwards of $980 billion annually (Andel et al., 2012).
These costs do not reflect the cost of lost quality of life or longevity as a result of injury.
While the cost of medical errors in the United States is staggering, the common basis for
comparing the impacts of the different types of medical errors will be the number of
annual deaths. According to Andel et al., (2012) $1.4 billion were attributed to mortality
rates.
Legal Cost of Medical Errors
The cost of human suffering and death aside, critical factors in their own right,
there are also legal ramifications with which hospitals must contend. The 2012 Annual
Report of the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) shows there were 9,194 medical
malpractice allegations filed, with the largest malpractice payment awarded to obstetricsrelated cases, averaging $572,199 per payment for 585 allegations. Diagnosis-related
cases that can be linked to the Emergency Department average $337,892 per payment for
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2,026 allegations. Surgery-related cases averaged $299,337 for 5,452 allegations (NPDB,
2014b). A study looking at NPDB data from 2009 showed that the three most common
types of adverse events in hospitals were classified as surgical, diagnostic, and treatment
(Bishop, Ryan, & Casalino, 2011). Results of the IOM report indicate that medication
errors added $5,000 to the cost of every hospital admission (Healey & McGowan, 2011).
According to a report by Healey and McGowan (2011), hospital-acquired infections
impact over 2 million patients each year with an annual cost of upwards of 11 billion.
Patients who sustain a fall stay 12 days longer in the hospital and have over $4,200
higher costs than patients who do not fall, and it is estimated that 7% of legal claims
against hospitals are a directly attributed to falls (Pham et al., 2012). According to the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2014a), in 2010 the direct medical cost of
patient falls on the U.S. healthcare system was $30 billion.
Tort reform in healthcare is intended to provide liability protection to physicians,
such as the “safe harbor” legislation, which provides protection to physicians when they
have followed designated guidelines; however, the medical liability system is riddled
with inefficiencies and inaccuracies (Kachalia, Little, Isavoran, Crider, & Smith, 2014).
Lipira and Gallagher (2014) argue that the inequities between the association of medical
errors and medical malpractice claims leaves physicians vulnerable and with a fear of
litigation causing them to not disclose adverse events. Evidence shows that traditional
tort reforms such as imposing damages caps and shortening the time period in statutes of
limitations are supposed to benefit physicians; however, they have not reduced the
number of claims against physicians and they do very little to address their concerns
about liability (Kachalia et al., 2014).
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Mechanisms to Address Errors
An organization’s performance depends on the actions of the management to
maximize assets at appropriate times (Carrigan & Kujawa, 2006). John Buell (2010)
reports that the only way to know if something needs correcting is for the people closest
to the process to help identify what is going on with the process. At the same time,
directors, managers, and executives need to be fully committed to supporting the findings
and recommendations (Buell, 2010).
Pepper and Spedding (2010) argue that failing to integrate cultural aspects of
continuous improvement strategies can limit the impact of the improvement; therefore, a
strategy that integrates culture with a scientific approach will be most beneficial. There
are many blueprints for how to engage managers in process improvement strategies;
however, this group may not be the most important one that needs to buy in. A culture
that embraces the idea that the work occurs on the floors of the departments with the front
line workers, not with the administration, has a better chance of reaching organizational
transformation (Grunden, 2009). Physician buy-in is critical for any process improvement
strategy to take hold (Carrigan & Kujawa, 2006). Research by Stock et al. (2006)
provides evidence that organizational culture plays an important role in addressing and
dealing with hospital errors. The study suggests a group culture with an emphasis on
human development, commitment to others, and participation appears to be a positive
factor in reducing errors, especially in early stages of a hospital’s error reduction plan.
They argue that if a hospital recognizes the importance of reducing medical errors, the
organizational culture should emphasize that goal and allocate resources toward obtaining
that goal (Stock et al., 2006).
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Healthcare has often turned to other high-risk industries such as aviation and
nuclear power to take on strategies to help mitigate errors. For example, tools such as
surgical checklists and team training (patterned off the aviation industry) have been some
of the more widely adopted strategies but still have not significantly impacted patient
safety (Makary, 2012). Stock et al. (2006) argue that insufficient training, the inability to
learn from past mistakes, and the failure to create a safety culture result in a greater
occurrence of medical errors.
High-risk industries such as air traffic control, air carriers and nuclear power have
been able to obtain high levels of safety and quality by implementing the principles of
highly reliable organization theory (O’Neill, 2011). Similar to errors in healthcare, errors
in aviation are most commonly associated with humans and the interaction with their
systems (Shappell et al., 2006). Tiny errors can turn quickly into a catastrophic event; the
difference in healthcare is that the event is one person at a time, whereas an aviation
event may impact up to several hundred individuals at one time. Awareness of the
necessity for organizational and cultural commitment to the principles of quality, as those
manifest within Highly Reliable Organizations, is key for establishing patient safety and
can play a role in the reduction of errors (Hines et al., 2008). However, hospitals must
align themselves consciously with these outcomes, as they do not occur serendipitously.
An examination of the theory that girds HROs frames this point.
Highly Reliable Organization Theory
Frameworks such as high reliable organization theory may take hospitals further
in their error reduction strategies by changing the healthcare culture to one focused on
reliability (Hines et al., 2008). Highly reliable organization theory posits that
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organizations can achieve acceptable levels of safety in hazardous environments through
the appropriate organization and management of technology, people and processes. The
theory emphasizes a culture of reliability and argues that training, learning and
redundancy of critical systems can lead to high levels of safety within complex, tightly
coupled systems (Stock et al., 2006). The principles of highly reliable organization theory
include sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience, deference to expertise,
preoccupation with failure, and a reluctance to simplify (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007).
Hospitals must understand these concepts and support an organizational culture in which
they can be applied (Hines et al., 2008). For a hospital, these principles would manifest
themselves to include heavy redundancy, specialization in training, information transfer
and transparency, high funding allocations and prioritizing safety (O’Neil, 2011).
Stock, McFadden and Gowen (2006) examined highly reliable organization
theory to address the problem of medical errors. They expected organizational culture to
play a significant role in the reduction of medical errors as it is a fundamental principle of
HRO theory. Their findings suggest that organizational culture does play an important
role in dealing with hospital errors, but that other cultural variables may be present and
impact the ability to deal with hospital errors. These include separate managerial
variables (personal managerial style) or separate organizational variables (organizational
alignments), for example; however, these variables only revealed a partial impact, and
organizational culture still plays the more prominent role. They suggest future research
between organizational cultures of different sub-departments within hospitals. They
hypothesize that differences between organizational cultures of Surgical Departments and
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Emergency Departments would lead to differences in error reduction outcomes (Stock
et al., 2006).
Characteristics of Highly Reliable Organizations
Highly reliable organizations (HRO) have certain common characteristics of the
environment in which they exist. The organization functions in a hazardous, fast-paced,
highly complex system (Baker et al., 2006; Beyea, 2005; Stock et al., 2006). According
to Baker et al. (2006), there are eight structural characteristics of a highly reliable
organization: (1) hyper-complexity; (2) tightly coupled; (3) extreme hierarchical
differentiation; (4) many decision makers working in complex communication networks;
(5) high degree of accountability; (6) frequent, immediate feedback regarding decisions;
(7) compressed time factors; and (8) synchronized outcomes. This hyper-complexity is
defined as “an extreme variety of components, systems, and levels, each having their own
standard procedures, training routines, and command hierarchy” (Baker et al., 2006,
p. 1586). HRO organizations are also tightly coupled, meaning there is interdependence
across many departments and levels. There are also clear differentiations in the
organizational structure in which levels and roles are clearly defined. There are many
decision makers working in a complex communication network, working simultaneously
toward the outcome, and because of the catastrophic consequences that can result from an
error, there is a high degree of accountability on the organization (Baker et al., 2006).
Therefore, it is not surprising that the IOM report, To Err is Human, advocates “enhanced
teamwork” (Baker et al., 2006) among physicians, nurses, and other healthcare providers,
as well as “interdisciplinary team training programs” through which managerial
principles and heightened communication are fostered (Kohn et al., 1999). Teamwork,
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then, is a critical element of HROs, and hospitals and other healthcare organizations must
necessarily “act as HROs” (Baker et al., 2006, p. 1590)
Cultures of Reliable Organizations
It has long been presumed that people are the greatest resource of an organization
and the key to providing outstanding performance (Delaney & Huselid, 1996). Highly
reliable organization theory holds that organizations can reach tolerable levels of safety in
high-risk or hazardous environments by using proper organization and management of
technology, people and processes (Stock et al., 2006). Highly reliable organizations
theory focuses on a culture of reliability and insists that training, learning, and
redundancy can lead to high levels of safety. The theory addresses organizations that
function in hazardous, fast-paced, highly complicated, and technically advanced settings
with relatively low occurrence of errors for long periods of time (Baker et al., 2006).
These organizations have certain attributes or characteristics that have allowed them to
function at a high level of reliability for long periods of time, even though the potential of
their failures could lead to catastrophic events. These organizations are designed and
managed so well that when an error does occur, the organization uses the knowledge
gained from the event to prevent similar errors reoccurring (Beyea, 2005). Research in
hospital settings indicates that the “context in which work occurs”—that is, the
“organizational culture”—is associated with patient safety (Provonost et al., 2006).
Therefore, the interplay between organizational culture and the desired outcomes of
patient safety bear consideration.
Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) argue that the difference between organizations that
are highly reliable and organizations that are not is that HRO’s act mindfully. They
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organize in a way that enables them to notice when the unexpected is happening;
therefore, they are able to stop the development of a full-blown error. If some of the
unexpected happenings do develop, the organization will remain resilient and focus on
the quick restoration of function. Weick and Sutcliffe suggest that for organizations that
are highly reliable, this mindfulness comes from a continual updating and deepening of
context, problem definition, and remedies. In other words, these organizations stay
focused on identifying problems, finding solutions, and making sure those solutions are
working. But the key is that HRO’s recognize in early stages the unexpected happenings
and meet the subtle signals of a potential problem with a strong response (Weick &
Sutcliffe, 2007). In addition, they foster communication and team work as concomitants
of effective, highly reliable organizations, which adapt the “lessons of high-reliability
science”—those from aviation, for example, and implement them into healthcare settings.
The Institute for Healthcare Improvement has provided ideas regarding why the
reliability of healthcare has been so inconsistent. This organization notes:
(1) improvement methods in healthcare are overly dependent on vigilance and hard work,
(2) benchmarking practices to mediocre outcomes gives a false sense of process
reliability, (3) the attitude of clinical autonomy creates wide and unjustifiable
performance variation, and (4) processes are not designed to meet reliability goals (Resar,
2006).
Hines et al. (2008) report that hospitals share many of the same environmental
characteristics of other organizations that have achieved high reliability: hypercomplexity; tight coupling; extreme hierarchical differentiation; multiple decision-makers
in a complex communication network; high degree of accountability; need for frequent,
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immediate feedback; and compressed time constraints. Hospitals are hyper-complex
environments that depend on the effective coordination of physicians, nurses,
pharmacists, technicians, and support staff to care for the patient. Hospitals are tightly
coupled, which means that teams of people depend on each other to accomplish tasks and
goals. For a patient undergoing surgery, teams of doctors, nurses, technicians,
housekeeping, and transport must be coordinated for the surgery to run smoothly.
Hospitals have a clear hierarchical differentiation, although in HROs during times of
crisis, decision-making is deferred to the most knowledgeable person on the team
regardless of his or her position. Hospitals have many decision-makers that must work
together for the best care of the patient. There is a high degree of accountability in
hospitals. Hospitals have the ability to get frequent and immediate feedback. It is a matter
of developing a system and mind-set that will allow people to receive and respond to that
feedback. Hospital staffs face time constraints daily and sometimes do not have the
resources to obtain additional assistance. Therefore, using highly reliable organization
theory as a framework through which to address errors and patient safety is appropriate.
While all of these environmental characteristics are shared among hospitals and
other HROs, Hines et al. (2008) noted there are two other challenges to the healthcare
environment that may be unique to that environment. First, higher workforce mobility:
hospitals tend to have a workforce that has a higher turnover rate and teams that are
frequently missing people. This results in additional costs to training, but also increases
the importance of standardization. Second, care of patients rather than machines: patients
are unpredictable, they are not mechanical and do not come with meticulously
documented handbooks. The behaviors of patients vary and they can change over time.
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These additional environmental characteristics do not mean that HRO concepts cannot be
integrated into healthcare organizations. It merely means they need to be accounted for
when HRO concepts are being introduced to healthcare.
There are hospitals that have demonstrated quality principles and have received
national quality awards. It can be argued that these hospitals represent organizations that
are on the pathways to becoming s highly reliable organizations and that the Malcolm
Baldrige Award, specifically, is an award that leads to the culmination of this journey.
Thus, Malcolm Baldrige awardees are on an evolutionary trajectory as they seek to
become HROs (Pope, 2015).
Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award
According to the Malcolm Baldrige website, the Malcolm Baldrige National
Quality Award, Public Law 100-107 signed on August 20, 1987, led to the creation of a
new public-private partnership (Malcolm Baldrige, 2014a). The findings and purposes
section of Public Law 100-107 states:
The leadership of the United States in product and process quality has been
challenged strongly (and sometimes successfully) by foreign competition, and our
Nation’s productivity growth has improved less than our competitor’s over the
last two decades. Strategic planning for quality and quality improvement
programs, through a commitment to excellence in manufacturing and services, are
becoming more and more essential to the well-being of our Nation’s economy and
our ability to compete effectively in the global marketplace. Improved
management understanding of the factory floor, worker involvement in quality,
and greater emphasis on statistical process control can lead to dramatic
improvements in the cost and quality of manufactured products. The concept of
quality improvement is directly applicable to small companies as well as large, to
service industries as well as manufacturing, and to the public sector as well as
private enterprise. In order to be successful, quality improvement programs must
be management-led and customer-oriented, and this may require fundamental
changes in the way companies and agencies do business. Several major industrial
nations have successfully coupled rigorous private-sector quality audits with
national awards giving special recognition to those enterprises the audits identify
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as the very best. A national quality award program of this kind in the United
States would help improve quality and productivity by:
helping to stimulate American companies to improve quality and productivity
for the pride of recognition while obtaining a competitive edge through
increased profits;
recognizing the achievements of those companies that improve the quality of
their goods and services and providing an example to others;
establishing guidelines and criteria that can be used by business, industrial,
governmental, and other organizations in evaluating their own quality
improvement efforts; and
providing specific guidance for other American organizations that wish to
learn how to manage for high quality by making available detailed
information on how winning organizations were able to change either cultures
and achieve eminence.
(Malcolm Baldrige, 2013e)
Performance excellence is specifically defined by the Baldrige Award as “an
integrated approach to organizational performance management that results in
(1) delivery of ever-improving value to customers and stakeholders, contributing to
organizational sustainability; (2) improvement of overall organizational effectiveness and
capabilities; and (3) organizational and personal learning” (Malcolm Baldrige, 2013c).
The Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award began recognizing healthcare institutions
in their pursuit of excellence in 1999. Since that time, there have been 19 U.S. healthcare
organizations/systems recognized with the National Quality Award. Table 3 identifies
these hospitals and their state, the year awarded, and the size of the hospital by indicating
the number of beds or indicating how many hospitals participate in the healthcare system.
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Table 3
Malcolm Baldrige Quality Award Winners in Healthcare
Hospital

State

Year Awarded

Hill Country Memorial

TX

2014

86 beds

St. David’s Heathcare

TX

2014

6 hospital system

Sutter Davis Hospital

CA

2013

48 beds

North Mississippi Health
Services

MS

2012

6 hospital system

Henry Ford Health System

MI

2011

5 hospital system

Scheck Medical Center

IN

2011

93 beds

Southcentral Foundation

AK

2011

3 hospital system

Advocate Good Samaritan
Hospital

IL

2010

333 beds

Atlanticare Regional Medical
Center

NJ

2009

589 beds

Heartland Health

MO

2009

353 beds

Poudre Valley Health

CO

2008

270 beds

Mercy Health System

WI

2007

3 hospital system

Sharp Healthcare

CA

2007

4 hospital system

North Mississippi Medical Center

MS

2006

650 beds

Bronson Methodist Hospital

MI

2005

404 beds

Robert Wood Johnson University
Hospital Hamilton

NJ

2004

242 beds

Baptist Hospital, Inc

FL

2003

492 beds

Saint Luke’s Health System (St.
Luke’s Hospital)

MO

2003

582 beds

MO, WI, IL, OK

2002

19 hospital system

SSM Health Care

Size
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For a healthcare organization to be eligible for the Malcolm Baldrige National
Quality Award, it must be headquartered in the United States; have existed for at least
one year; ensure that operational practices are available for examination and information
from the seven criteria categories, and can be shared. In 2012 an additional eligibility
requirement was adopted. Organizations must also have a recent history of performance
excellence, by having been evaluated by the national Baldrige Award committee (having
previously won, or having recently received a site visit, or having scored an 8 or higher
on feedback reports); having received a top performance award from another program in
the Alliance for Performance Excellence; having 25% or more of the organization
workforce located outside the organization’s home state; or indicating there is no
Alliance for Performance Excellence program available for the respective organization
(Malcolm Baldrige, 2013d).
In addition to the application addressing the seven criteria categories, fees
associated with the cost of administering the award are due by the applicant (Malcolm
Baldrige, 2013d). A nonrefundable $360 fee to certify eligibility is due along with an
application fee. For healthcare organizations with faculty and staff of 500 or more, the
application fee is $18,000 (for faculty and staff under 500, $9,600). Those healthcare
organizations earning a site visit based off of their application submission will be charged
a site visit fee. For healthcare organizations with faculty and staff of 500 or more, the site
visit fee is between $50,000 and $60,000 (for faculty and staff under 500, the site visit fee
is between $30,000 and $35,000). Of course also is the cost of personnel for the hospital
organization to prepare documents and host accreditors (Malcolm Baldrige, 2013b).
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Malcolm Baldrige Indicators of Excellence and HRO Principles
Research by Pope (2015) suggests that a number of Malcolm Baldrige Health
Care criteria are congruent with standards of highly reliable organizations. Therefore, the
quality indicators of the Malcolm Baldrige Award can logically be mapped on to the
principles existing in highly reliable organizations. This mapping is a contribution to the
literature from this study. See Table 4 below.
The preface section of the Baldrige Award requires applicants to understand the
essence of their organizations and to demonstrate the collaborative and competitive
environment in which they operate. These indicators reflect the following HRO
principles: sensitivity to operations, preoccupation with failure, and a commitment to
resilience.
Category 1 of the Baldrige Award reflects leadership and overall governance of
the organization. These indicators of quality reflect sensitivity to operations. Category 2
reflects strategic planning which can be mapped to the HRO principles of sensitivity to
operations and commitment to resilience. Category 3 reflects customer focus, which
reflects sensitivity to operations from a unique viewpoint. Category 4 focuses on
measurement, analysis and knowledge management, and can be reflected in all five HRO
principles: sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience, preoccupation with failure,
deference to expertise, and reluctance to simplify. Category 5 focuses on the workforce
the capability and capacity and can be mapped to deference of expertise, sensitivity to
operations, and reluctance to simplify. Category 6 examines the organization’s operations
and can be mapped on to all five HRO principles. Category 7 focuses on results of the
organization, and would also reflect all five principles of highly reliable organizations:
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Table 4
Indicators of Excellence from Malcolm Baldrige Award and Healthgrades Awards as
They Are Aligned with Principles of Highly Reliable Organization Theory
Principle of HRO

Malcolm Baldrige

Healthgrades

Sensitivity to
Operations

Demonstrate an understanding of their
organization and a collaborative and
competitive environment.
Category 1: Leadership and governance
Category 2: Strategic planning
Category 3: Customer focus
Category 4: Measurement, analysis, and
knowledge management
Category 5: Workforce capability and
capacity
Category 6: Organizational operations
Category 7: Results/Outcomes of the
organization

Clinical Outcomes for
common procedures
utilizing risk adjusted
methodology to account
for co-morbidities.

Commitment to
Resilience

Category 2: Strategic planning
Category 4: Measurement, analysis, and
knowledge management
Category 6: Organizational operations
Category 7: Results/Outcomes of the
organization

Clinical Outcomes for
common procedures
utilizing risk adjusted
methodology to account
for co-morbidities.

Deference to Expertise

Category 4: Measurement, analysis, and
knowledge management
Category 5: Workforce capability and
capacity
Category 6: Organizational operations
Category 7: Results/Outcomes of the
organization

Clinical Outcomes for
common procedures
utilizing risk adjusted
methodology to account
for co-morbidities.

Preoccupation with
Failure

Category 4: Measurement, analysis, and
knowledge management
Category 6: Organizational operations
Category 7: Results/Outcomes of the
organization

Clinical Outcomes for
common procedures
utilizing risk adjusted
methodology to account
for co-morbidities.

Reluctance to Simplify

Category 4: Measurement, analysis, and
knowledge management
Category 5: Workforce capability and
capacity
Category 6: Organizational operations
Category 7: Results/Outcomes of the
organization

Clinical Outcomes for
common procedures
utilizing risk adjusted
methodology to account
for co-morbidities.
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sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience, deference to expertise, preoccupation
with failure, and reluctance to simplify.
All of the categories of the Malcolm Baldrige Award are relevant to the focus on
medical error reduction. Each of these categories reflects an area in which the literature
has identified as impacting the rate of medical errors. For example, Categories 1 and 2
reflect leadership, overall governance, and strategic planning, which has been stated in
numerous studies as essential for the reduction of medical errors (Carrigan & Kujawa,
2006; Provonost et al., 2006; Resar, 2006; Sherman, 2010; Stock et al., 2006). Category 3
reflects a customer focus, which would mean in a hospital setting patient-centered, again
with a number of studies showing patient-centered care should be the goal (Dabney &
Tzeng, 2013; Schall, Sevin, & Wasson, 2009; Wolf, Lehman, Quinlan, Zullo, &
Hoffman, 2008). Categories 4 and 7 reflect identification of problem areas. Results from
a number of studies suggest reporting and tracking errors is critical information to their
reduction (Carrigan & Kujawa, 2006; Garrouste-Orgeas et al., 2012; Stock et al., 2006).
Finally, Categories 5 and 6 reflect the workforce and the organization’s operations, which
also have been identified in the literature through teamwork studies as being important to
the reduction of medical errors (Baker et al., 2006; Starmer et al., 2013).
Healthgrades Distinguished Hospital Clinical Excellence Award
The second national quality award recognized in this study is the Healthgrades
Distinguished Hospital Clinical Excellence Award. In 1998, Healthgrades began
objectively evaluating the quality of nearly every hospital in the United States in order to
recognize top performing hospitals providing the best outcomes for their patients
(Healthgrades, 2014). Their purpose is to provide critical information to consumers when
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selecting a physician or hospital. The evaluations of hospitals are done completely on
clinical outcomes. There is no fee to in order to be evaluated by Healthgrades; however,
there is a licensing fee to market or publicize any award received and the amount can
vary and may be upwards of $145,000 (Rau, 2013). The Healthgrades methodology uses
approximately 40 million Medicare discharge reports for the most recent 3-year period,
data from the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality as well as voluntary
submission forms from hospitals. Data are examined with adjustments for patient’s age,
gender, and medical condition. The clinical outcomes of each hospital are analyzed using
a logistic regression-based, risk-adjusted model that collects data for 31 procedures and
conditions, 14 patient safety indicators, 10 patient experience indicators, 22 timely and
effective care indicators, and 3 readmission rates.
Individual risk models are established for each condition relative to each specific
outcome. Using these models, Healthgrades is able to attach star ratings to each of the
conditions or procedures outcomes for each hospital. The hospital performances in these
categories are then stratified into one of three performance categories: 1 star =
performance that is statistically worse than expected; 3 stars = performance that is not
statistically different than expected; and 5 stars = performance that is statistically better
than expected (Healthgrades, 2013b). A listing of the Overall Clinical Awards and
Specialty Awards is outlined in Appendix B.
The Distinguished Hospital for Clinical Excellence Award acknowledges that
many hospitals have specific areas of expertise and high-quality outcomes in certain
areas; however, the hospitals receiving this award exhibit comprehensive high-quality
care based on risk-adjusted mortality and complication rates for common procedures and
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conditions. Using Medicare inpatient data from the Medicare Provider Analysis and
Review database, hospitals must have had a minimum of 30 cases over the last 3 years of
the study and at least 5 cases in the most recent year of study in at least 19 of the 27 listed
conditions/procedures. Data gathered from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services Medicare Provider Analysis and Review were obtained and a listing of all
eligible hospitals that met the criteria was developed. Hospitals that met the criteria were
analyzed further. The average performance rating and average z-score for each hospital
was calculated by averaging all of their Medicare Provider Analysis and Review-based
performance ratings. The corresponding z-scores for all outcomes (in-hospital
complications, in-hospital mortality, 30-day mortality, and 180-day mortality) are
averaged as well. Hospitals were then ranked in descending order by their average overall
performance any ties were broken by average z-score. The top 5% of hospitals in the
United States were then identified (Healthgrades, 2013b).
Healthgrades’ quality and excellence programs focus exclusively on healthcare
organizations. However, Healthgrades’ programs focus on quality outcomes rather than a
holistic review of the organization. Blending the Malcolm Baldrige Award and
Healthgrades Distinguished Hospital Award provides the most solid support for a
hospital earning “national quality award” status in this project. A mapping of indicators
in the Healthgrades database and principles of HROs is also in Table 4 above.
Although logic suggests hospitals receiving national quality awards have lower
levels of medical errors and better performance on quality indicators, the literature does
not indicate whether this is the case. Therefore, non-national award-winning hospitals
will be included in the study to determine whether award winners do have lesser error
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rates than non-national award winners. It is plausible that non-national award winners
may have equivalent error rates as award winners; however, they may not have the time
or the money or personnel to apply for national awards.
Medicare Hospital Compare Quality of Care Database
The data source for this project is the Medicare Hospital Compare Quality of Care
database was established by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) in
partnership with organizations representing consumers, doctors, hospitals, accrediting
agencies, and other federal agencies to provide the best information possible to patients
seeking information on the track records of Medicare-certified doctors and hospitals in
the United States. The purpose of the database is to improve hospitals’ quality of care by
distributing objective, easy-to-understand data on hospital performance, as well as quality
information from the consumer’s perspective (Medicare Hospital Compare, 2014a).
The variables captured in the database are agreed upon between the CMS,
hospital industry, and public stakeholder representatives such as The Joint Commission,
National Quality Forum and the Agency for Research Quality in Healthcare, and hospital
industry leaders (Medicare Hospital Compare, 2014c). Table 5 identifies the variables
reported on in the Medicare Hospital Compare database.
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Table 5
Medicare Hospital Compare Database Variables
Category

Variable

Survey of Patients’ Patients reported nurses “always” communicated well
Experiences

Timely and
Effective Care

Scale
%

Patients reported doctors “always” communicated well

%

Patients reported they “always” received help as soon as they
wanted

%

Patients reported their pain was “always” well controlled

%

Patients reported staff “always” explained medications before
giving

%

Patients reported their room and bathroom was “always” clean

%

Patients reported their room was “always” quiet at night

%

Patients reported they were given information on recovery at home

%

Patients gave their hospital a rating of 9 or 10 on a scale from 0-10

%

Patients reported they would definitely recommend the hospital

%

Average # of minutes before outpatients with chest pain or possible
heart attack was transferred to another hospital

Min

Average # of minutes before outpatients with chest pain or possible
heart attack got ECG

Min

Outpatients with chest pain or possible heart attack who got drugs
to break up clots within 30 minutes of arrival

%

Outpatients with chest pain or possible heart attach who got aspirin
with 24 hours of arrival

%

Heart attack patients given PCI within 90 minutes of arrival

%

Heart attack patients given aspirin at discharge

%

Heart attack patients given a prescription for statin at discharge

%

Heart failure patients given discharge instructions

%

Heart failure patients given an evaluation of left ventricular
systolic function

%

Heart failure patients given ACE inhibitor or ARB for left
ventricular systolic dysfunction

%

Pneumonia patients whose initial ER blood culture was performed
prior to administration of first hospital dose of antibiotics

%

Pneumonia patients given the most appropriate initial antibiotic

%

Outpatients having surgery who got an antibiotic at the right time

%
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Table 5—Continued
Category

Variable

Scale

Timely and
Effective Care,
cont.

Surgery patients who were given an antibiotic at the right time

%

Surgery patients whose preventative antibiotics were stopped at the
right time

%

Patients who got treatment at the right time to help prevent blood
clots after certain types of surgery

%

Outpatients having surgery who got the right kind of antibiotic

%

Surgery patients who were taking beta blockers, were kept on
before and after their surgery

%

Surgery patients given the right kind of antibiotic

%

Heart surgery patients whose blood sugar is kept under good
control in the days right after surgery

%

Surgery patients whose urinary catheters were removed on the first
or second day after surgery

%

Patients having surgery who were actively warmed in the OR or
whose body temperature was near normal by the end of surgery

%

Average time patients spent in ED before they were admitted to
hospital as an inpatient

Min

Average time patients spent in ED after the doctor decided to admit
them as an inpatient before leaving the ED

Min

Average time patients spent in the ED before being sent home

Min

Average time patients spent in the ED before they were seen by a
healthcare professional

Min

Average time patients who came to the ED with broken bones had
to wait before receiving pain medication

Min

Percentage of patients who left the ED before being seen

%

Percentage of patients who came to ED with stroke symptoms who
received brain scan results within 45 minutes of arrival

%

Patients assessed and given influenza vaccination

%

Patients assessed and given pneumonia vaccination

%

Children who received reliever medication while hospitalized for
asthma

%

Children who received systemic corticosteroid medication while
hospitalized for asthma

%
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Table 5—Continued
Category

Variable

Scale

Timely and
Effective Care,
cont.

Children and their caregivers who received a home management
plan of care document while hospitalized for asthma

%

Ischemic stroke patients who got medicine to break up a blood clot
within 3 hours after symptoms started

%

Ischemic stroke patients who received medicine known to prevent
complications caused by blood clots within 2 days of arriving at
the hospital

%

Ischemic or hemorrhagic stroke patients who received treatment to
keep blood clots from forming anywhere in the body within 2 days
of arriving at the hospital

%

Ischemic stroke patients who received a prescription for medicine
known to prevent complications caused by blood clots before
discharge

%

Ischemic stroke patients with a type of irregular heartbeat who
were given a prescription for a blood thinner at discharge

%

Ischemic stroke patients needing medicine to lower cholesterol
who were given a prescription for this medication before discharge

%

Ischemic or hemorrhagic stroke patients or caregivers who
received written materials about stroke care and prevention during
their hospital stay

%

Ischemic or hemorrhagic stroke patients who were evaluated for
rehabilitation services

%

Patients with blood clots who got the recommended treatment

%

Patients with blood clots who were treated with an intravenous
blood thinner and checked for increased risk of bleeding

%

Patients who got treatment to prevent blood clots on the day of or
after admission for surgery

%

Patients who got treatment to prevent blood clots on the day of or
after being admitted to ICU

%

Patients who developed blood clot while in the hospital who did
not get treatment that could have prevented it

%

Patients with blood clots who were discharged on a blood thinner
medication and received written instruction on that med

%

Percent of newborns whose deliveries were scheduled too early,
when a scheduled delivery was not medically necessary

%
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Table 5—Continued
Category

Variable

Scale

Readmissions,
Complications &
Death

Rate of unplanned readmission for heart attack patients

No better;
Average;
Better

Death rate for heart attack patients

No better;
Average;
Better

Rate of unplanned readmission for heart failure patients

No better;
Average;
Better

Death rate for heart failure patients

No better;
Average;
Better

Rate of unplanned readmission for pneumonia patients

No better;
Average;
Better

Death rate for pneumonia patients

No better;
Average;
Better

Rate of unplanned readmission after hip/knee surgery

No better;
Average;
Better

Rate of unplanned readmission after discharge from hospital
(hospital-wide)

No better;
Average;
Better

Rate of complications for hip/knee replacement patients

No better;
Average;
Better

Serious complications

No better;
Average;
Better

Death among patients with serious treatable complications after
surgery

No better;
Average;
Better

Central line-associated bloodstream infections

No better;
Average;
Better

Catheter-associated urinary tract infections

No better;
Average;
Better

Surgical site infections from colon surgery

No better;
Average;
Better
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Table 5—Continued
Category

Variable

Scale

Readmissions,
Complications &
Death, cont.

Surgical site infections from abdominal hysterectomy

No better;
Average;
Better

Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA) blood
laboratory identified events

No better;
Average;
Better

Clostridium difficile laboratory identified events

No better;
Average;
Better

PCI readmission rate within 30 days of hospital discharge
following PCI procedure

No better;
Average;
Better

Use of Medical
Imaging

Outpatients with low back pain who had an MRI without trying
recommended treatments first, such as physical therapy

%

Outpatients who had a follow-up mammogram, ultrasound, or MRI
of the breast within 45 days after a screening mammogram

%

Outpatient CT scans of the chest that were “combination” (double)
scans

%

Outpatient CT scans of the abdomen that were “combination”
(double) scans

%

Outpatients who got cardiac imaging stress tests before low-risk
outpatient surgery

%

Outpatients with brain CT scans who got a sinus CT at the same
time

%

Medicare Payment

Medicare hospital spending per patient

Ratio

Number of
Medicare Patients

Shows the number of Medicare patients with a certain condition
that a hospital treated during the current data collection period.

Number

The Hospital Compare data are made up of a mixture of self-reported information
through multiple CMS reporting systems, data submitted to the Joint Commission,
Medicare enrollment and claims data, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
and Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (Medicare
Hospital Compare, 2014c). Not all variables reported on by the Medicare Hospital
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Compare database are used in this study. Discussion on the refinement of the variables is
detailed in Chapter III.
Summary
Medical errors continue to be a major problem in the United States healthcare
system. New research suggests upwards of 440,000 people die each year due to medical
errors (James, 2013). A logical framework in which to evaluate medical errors is by the
frequency and severity of cost in which they occur. In this framework, medical errors in
Operating Departments and Emergency Departments occur more frequently than in
Obstetric Departments. However, cost of malpractice settlements in obstetrics is much
higher than in Operating Departments or Emergency Departments. Other high-risk
industries such as air traffic control, air carriers, and nuclear power have successfully
implemented highly reliable organization theory (HROT) and have incredible safety and
quality records to show for it, supporting the idea that HROT may be applicable to
healthcare environments to reduce medical errors. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some
elements of HROT are already in the hospital culture, especially those that have received
national quality awards. By using data from the Medicare Hospital Compare database,
this study assesses clinical performance outcomes related to quality in national quality
award-winning hospitals and non-national quality award-winning hospitals. The
hypothesis of the study is that hospitals receiving specific national quality awards will
have better clinical performance indicators on quality variables than hospitals that have
not received these national quality awards.

CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
Overview of Purpose and Methods
The To Err is Human report by the Institute of Medicine highlighted the need for
hospitals to focus on patient safety, and recent research estimates that upwards of
440,000 people die each year due to medical errors in the United States (James, 2013).
With the understanding that medical errors and quality are hand-in-hand concepts, the
purpose of this study is to better understand the association between national quality
award-winning hospitals and their clinical performance outcomes as compared to nonnational quality award-winning hospitals, and determine if there is a difference in three
high-risk departments of these hospitals.
The Research Questions are as follows:
1. Do hospitals that have won national quality awards (Malcolm Baldrige and/or
Distinguished Clinical Excellence Award) have higher scores in key quality
performance variables (clinical excellence) than non-national award-winning
hospitals?
2. Do Obstetric Departments in hospitals that have won national quality awards
(Malcolm Baldrige and/or Distinguished Clinical Excellence Award) have
higher scores in key quality performance variables (clinical excellence) than
Obstetric Departments in non-national award-winning hospitals?
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3. Do Operating Departments in hospitals that have won national quality awards
(Malcolm Baldrige and/or Distinguished Clinical Excellence Award) have
higher scores in key quality performance variables (clinical excellence) than
Operating Departments in non-national award-winning hospitals?
4. Do Emergency Departments in hospitals that have won national quality
awards (Malcolm Baldrige and/or Distinguished Clinical Excellence Award)
have higher scores in key quality performance variables (clinical excellence)
than Emergency Departments in non-national award-winning hospitals?
This project proposes the following hypotheses:
H0: Hospitals that have received a national quality award are similar to hospitals
that have not received a national quality award on quality variables.
H1: Hospitals that have received a national quality award have better
performance outcomes on quality variables than hospitals that have not
received a national quality award.
H0: Obstetrics Departments in hospitals that have won a national quality award
are similar to Obstetrics Departments in hospitals that have not received a
national quality award on quality variables.
H2: Obstetrics Departments in hospitals that have won a national quality award
have better performance outcomes on quality variables than Obstetrics
Departments in hospitals that have not received a national quality award.
H0: Operating Departments in hospitals that have won a national quality award
are similar to Operating Departments in hospitals that have not received a
national quality award on quality variables.
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H3: Operating Departments in hospitals that have won a national quality award
have better performance outcomes on quality variables than Operating
Departments in hospitals that have not received a national quality award.
H0: Emergency Departments in hospitals that have won a national quality award
are similar to Emergency Departments in hospitals that have not received a
national quality award on quality variables.
H4: Emergency Departments in hospitals that have won a national quality award
have better performance outcomes on quality variables than Emergency
Departments in hospitals that have not received a national quality award.
The study utilized a two-sample t test (also known as independent sample t test) to
examine the associations between two groups of hospitals (national quality awardwinning and non-national quality award-winning) and 11 key quality variables from the
timely and effective care section collected by the Medicare Hospital Compares Database.
The two-sample t test was selected first because the data met the first three assumptions
that would suggest it is appropriate to use the t test for analysis. The dependent variable
data are continuous; the independent variable has two categories (national award-winning
and non-national award-winning); and there are different participants in each group with
no overlap (Laerd Statistics, 2015).
Data housed in the Medicare Hospital Compares Database was collected through
a number of different sources, including voluntary reporting from the CMS Abstraction
and Reporting Tool, Medicare Enrollment and Claims data, VA Administrative Data,
National Healthcare Safety Network by the CDC, and AHRQ Patient Safety Indicators
(Medicare Hospital Compare, 2014c).
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The timely and effective care variables indicate the percentage of patients who
received best practice treatments for their condition and determine how quickly patients
are treated with certain medical emergencies, as well as reflect preventive treatment.
Measures reported here reflect the accepted standard of care based on current scientific
evidence. The measures are regularly reviewed and revised to ensure they are up to date.
The measures do not have a risk adjustment calculation, but are reported as percentages
(Medicare Hospital Compare, 2014b). There are 86 total variables collected by the
Medicare Hospital Compare database, with 50 variables listed in the timely and effective
care category (Medicare Hospital Compare, 2014d).
The key quality variables in this project come from the timely and effective care
category and have been refined from the 50 variables in that category to 11 through an
examination of the empirical literature as well as professional organizations and societies
dealing with healthcare quality.
The 11 variables are: Average number of minutes before EKG is completed for
patients with chest pains; Heart attack patients given PCI within 90 minutes of arrival;
Heart Failure patients given ACE inhibitor or ARB for Left Ventricular Systolic
Dysfunction; Pneumonia patients given the most appropriate initial antibiotic; Patients
having surgery who got an antibiotic at the right time prior to surgery; Patients having
surgery who got the right kind of antibiotic; Heart surgery patients whose blood glucose
is kept under control in the days after surgery; Surgery patients whose urinary catheters
were removed on the first or second day of surgery; Average time patients spent in ER
before they were admitted to the hospital as an inpatient; Surgery patients who received
appropriate venous thromboembolism prophylaxis within 24 hours prior to surgery to 24
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hours after surgery; and Newborns whose deliveries were scheduled too early when it
was not medically necessary.
The identification of the key quality variables used in this project was established
by cross-referencing quality indicators from the National Quality Forum (2014b);
American Medical Association (2014); National Committee for Quality Assurance
(2014); American College of Cardiology (2014); National Quality Measures Clearing
House (2014); Ambulatory Care Quality (AQA) Alliance (2014); and empirical research
from Caretta, Chukmaitov, Tang, and Shin (2013); Nietert et al. (2007); and Moore et al.,
(2013). Table 6 below identifies the variables selected and the professional societies and
empirical studies that have identified them as a focus for quality as well as the
unit/department those variables can be attributed to.

Table 6
Refined Variables of the Medicare Compare Database
Indicators

Medicare
Compare

National
Quality
Forum

American
Medical
Association

Heart Attack patients
given PCI within 90
Minutes

X

Avg # of minutes before
ECG was given

X

X

Heart Failure patients
given ACE inhibitor or
ARB for LVSD

X

X

Pneumonia where
appropriate antibiotics
were given

X

Heart Surgery patients
with controlled blood
sugar

X

National
American
Committee College of
for Quality Cardiology
Assurance
X

Studies

X

X
X

X

X
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Table 6—Continued
Indicators

Medicare
Compare

National
Quality
Forum

American
Medical
Association

Surgery patients with
urinary catheters
removed timely

X

X

Surgery patients who
received appropriate
venous
thromboembolism
prophylaxis within 24
hours prior to surgery to
24 hours after surgery

X

X

% of newborns whose
deliveries were
scheduled too early
when it was not
medically necessary

X

X

Avg time patients spent
in ER before being
admitted

X

Patients having surgery
who got antibiotics at
the right time

X

Patients having surgery
who got right kind of
antibiotics

X

National
American
Committee College of
for Quality Cardiology
Assurance

Studies

X

X

X

X

Research Design
The design used in this study is a quantitative approach using 2014 data from an
open source the Medicare Hospital Compare Quality of Care database. Data from
national quality award-winning hospitals and non-national quality award-winning
hospitals were compared against each other using a two-sample t test. The two-sample
t test allowed for a comparison between the means of two unrelated groups, in this case
national award-winning hospitals versus non-national award-winning hospitals and their
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performance outcomes in the refined key quality variables. All hospitals reporting into
the Medicare Hospital Compare database were included in the analysis. The exception
were those hospitals that are missing data from half or more of the identified variables. A
confidence level of 95% was used in the analysis.
Population and Sampling
According to the Medicare.gov website, there are 4,861 hospitals that are
Medicare-certified and that are reported on in the Medicare Hospital Compare database
(CMS, 2014b). In order to resolve any sampling issues or errors that might have
occurred, all hospitals reported on in the Medicare Hospital Compare database were
included in the analysis. Exceptions include those hospitals that are missing data for half
or more of the variables, as it is unlikely that missing data for that many variables are due
to random chance, but more likely are due to an undesirable characteristic (i.e., no ED,
OB, or OD units) in the hospital for this project. For example, the institution that is not an
acute care hospital, but a specialty organization that still reports to Medicare, is not a
focus of this project. All hospitals will offer Emergency Department (ED), Obstetrics
(OB-GYN), and Operating Department (OD) services and provide Acute Care Services.
There are 19 Malcolm Baldrige Quality Award in Healthcare recipients, and 474
hospitals have earned the 2012, 2013, or 2014 Healthgrades Distinguished Hospital for
Clinical Excellence Award. Hospitals were categorized into national quality awardwinning hospitals (if they have received the Malcolm Baldrige Quality Award, and/or
Distinguished Hospital for Clinical Excellence Award) or non-national quality awardwinning hospitals (if they have not received one of these awards).
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Data Collection Procedures and Timelines
Human Subject Institutional Review Board approval was obtained to collect the
data from the open-source Medicare Hospital Compare database. These data were
downloaded from the Medicare website. These data reflect ratings from the last quarter of
2014. The data are able for download in an Excel format that easily uploaded into the
SPSS version 22 software program that was used to run the statistical analysis. Prior to
any running of analyses, the data were scrubbed, identifying only the 11 refined key
quality variables and looking for missing data. Hospitals were coded using a
State/Number identifier, such as MI-1 represented Michigan hospital #1.
Hospitals that were missing data for half (6) or more of the project’s variables
were excluded from the spreadsheet. Data collection was completed by March 31, 2015.
Instrumentation and/or Data Collection Protocols
Prior to the beginning of data collection, an exemption from the Human Subjects
Institutional Research Board (HSIRB) was obtained, as these data are open source, there
was no contact with human subjects, and no information can be attributed to an
individual. After securing exemption from the HSIRB, data collection began with a
download of 2014 data from the over 4,000 hospitals reported in the Medicare Hospital
Compare database. All of the national quality award-winning hospitals were identified
and coded. There are 19 Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award winners for
healthcare since 2002, and 474 hospitals have been awarded the Healthgrades
Distinguished Hospital for Clinical Excellence Award since 2012.
Once all hospitals in the national quality award-winning category had been
identified, the remaining hospitals reported in the Medicare Hospital Compare database
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were selected into the non-national quality award-winning category. The non-national
quality award-winning hospitals had not received either the Malcolm Baldrige National
Quality Award or the Healthgrades Distinguished Hospital for Clinical Excellence
Award. However, they could have received specialty awards or other awards.
Once all hospitals for the project were selected into national quality awardwinning or non-national quality award-winning, data collection of the key quality
variables began. Any hospital that has missing data for half or more of the key quality
variables was excluded from the analysis, as it is unlikely that the missing data are due to
random chance. Appendix C includes the data collection worksheet used in this project.
The variables collected have a mixture of different types of reporting scales, minutes, and
percentages. Table 7 identifies the reporting scales, the type of data, and the analysis
used.
For those variables reporting in percentages, data transformation (e.g., arcsine)
was completed to account for any skewness in distribution prior to conducting the twosample t test.

Table 7
Specific Key Variables for Data Analysis from Medicare Hospital Compare Database
Variable
Heart attack patients given PCI
within 90 minutes of arrival
Average number of minutes
before ECG is completed for
patients with chest pains

Scale

Type

Analysis

Percentage

Continuous

Independent t test/
Mann–Whitney U test

Minutes

Continuous

Independent t test/
Mann–Whitney U test
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Table 7—Continued
Variable

Scale

Type

Analysis

Heart Failure patients given
ACE inhibitor or ARB for Left
Ventricular Systolic Dysfunction

Percentage

Continuous

Independent t test/
Mann–Whitney U test

Pneumonia patients given the
most appropriate initial
antibiotic

Percentage

Continuous

Independent t test/
Mann–Whitney U test

Heart surgery patients whose
blood glucose is kept under
control in the days after surgery

Percentage

Continuous

Independent t test/
Mann–Whitney U test

Surgery patients whose urinary
catheters were removed on the
first or second day of surgery

Percentage

Continuous

Independent t test/
Mann–Whitney U test

Surgery patients who received
appropriate venous
thromboembolism prophylaxis
within 24 hours prior to surgery
to 24 hours after surgery

Percentage

Continuous

Independent t test/
Mann–Whitney U test

Newborns whose deliveries were
schedule too early when it was
not medically necessary

Percentage

Continuous

Independent t test/
Mann–Whitney U test

Average time patients spent in
ER before they were admitted to
the hospital as an inpatient.

Minutes

Continuous

Independent t test/
Mann–Whitney U test

Patients having surgery who got
an antibiotic at the right time
prior to surgery

Percentage

Continuous

Independent t test/
Mann–Whitney U test

Patients having surgery who got
the right kind of antibiotic

Percentage

Continuous

Independent t test/
Mann–Whitney U test

Data Analysis Plan
A two-sample t test (with a 95% confidence level) using the computing software,
SPSS was conducted in this project; however, if any assumptions to the two-sample t test
were violated, then a non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test was conducted as needed.
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The independent variable is the hospitals grouped into national quality award-winning
and non-national quality award-winning. The dependent variable for the Emergency
Department was the average time (in minutes) that patients spent in the ED before they
were admitted to the hospital as an inpatient. This variable reports only those patients
who were actually admitted to the hospital and does not include patients not admitted.
This variable was selected to represent the Emergency Department because research
shows that timeliness in the Emergency Department is critical to certain illnesses (heart
attacks, sepsis, stroke) and can be a measure of quality and safety for Emergency
Departments (Pham et al., 2014). The dependent variables for the Operating Department
were whether the patients received the right kind of antibiotic prior to surgery as well as
if they received the antibiotic at the right time. These variables were selected because
empirical evidence indicates surgical site infections are considered to be the most
preventable form of nosocomial infections among surgery patients, is directly linked to
the surgery department, and considered to reflect quality in the Operating Department
(Mujagic et al., 2014). Finally, the dependent variable for the Obstetrics Department was
newborns whose deliveries were scheduled, either by caesarean section or induction, 1 to
3 weeks early when it was not medically necessary. This is the only variable in the
Medicare Compare database that reports on obstetrics. However, the Association of
Women’s Health, Obstetric and Neonatal Nurses (AWHONN, 2014) argues that labor is
a complex physiologic event for women involving intricate interactions with multiple
hormones that should not be induced, altered, or augmented unless medically warranted.
A two-sample t test was conducted for the remaining variables that were selected
for their linkage to empirical studies or identification by professional associations and
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societies: Average number of minutes before ECG is completed for patients with chest
pains; Heart attack patients given percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI) within 90
minutes of arrival; Heart Failure patients given angiotensin-converting-enzyme (ACE)
inhibitor or angiotensin receptor blockers (ARB) for Left Ventricular Systolic
Dysfunction; Pneumonia patients given the most appropriate initial antibiotic; Patients
having surgery who was given an antibiotic at the right time prior to surgery; Patients
having surgery who received the right kind of antibiotic; Heart surgery patients whose
blood glucose is kept under control in the days after surgery; and Surgery patients who
received appropriate venous thromboembolism prophylaxis within 24 hours prior to
surgery to 24 hours after surgery.
Using the two-sample t test allowed for the analysis of the means between the two
groups (national quality award-winning and non-national quality award-winning
hospitals) and the performance outcome for the quality variable being examined. The
t test determined whether a hospital having earned a national quality award has
statistically significant differences in their mean performance outcome score of key
quality variables as compared to non-national quality award-winning hospitals. However,
if any of the assumptions to use the two sample t test were violated, then the nonparametric Mann–Whitney U test was used to determine differences in medians of
performance. Figure 1 identifies the process of analysis for the key quality variables of
this project.
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Figure 1. Conceptual map of data analysis.
Delimitations
Several delimitations were chosen in order to establish homogeneity among
hospital subjects. The entire population of hospitals that report into the U.S. Medicare
Hospital Compare database was initially selected; however, hospitals that had missing
data for half or more of the refined variables were excluded. The Medicare Hospital
Compare database collects information on 86 variables, but only those in the Timely and
Effective Care category were selected, because these variables were unaltered in any
way. Next, the variables were refined from 86 to 11 through a search of quality indicators
from the literature and professional societies and association; however, selection of
different variables may yield different results. Finally, it is also noted that hospitals that
have self-selected to apply for a national quality award such as the Malcolm Baldrige

74
may have better funding, more staff, and more resources not necessarily directly related
to quality that is not being measured in this study.
Summary
A quantitative methodology utilizing the Medicare Hospital Compare database as
the data source answered the research questions posed in this study:
1. Do hospitals that have won national quality awards (Malcolm Baldrige and/or
Distinguished Clinical Excellence Award) have higher scores in key quality
performance variables (clinical excellence) than non-national award-winning
hospitals?
2. Do Obstetric Departments in hospitals that have won national quality awards
have higher scores in key quality performance variables (clinical excellence)
than Obstetric Departments in non-national award-winning hospitals?
3. Do Operating Departments in hospitals that have won national quality awards
have higher scores in key quality performance variables (clinical excellence)
than Operating Departments in non-national award-winning hospitals?
4. Do Emergency Departments in hospitals that have won national quality
awards have higher scores in key quality performance variables (clinical
excellence) than Emergency Departments in non-national award-winning
hospitals?
Refined data in the Medicare Hospital Compare database, from the timely and effective
care section, was categorized into national quality award-winning versus non-national
quality award-winning. The refinement of the variables from the Medicare Hospital
Compare database was based on examination of empirical studies and review of
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professional medical associations to examine only key indicators of quality. The data
analysis plan proposed to conduct a two-sample (independent) t test or Mann–Whitney
U test for the analysis in order to address the research questions posed.

CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Overview of Purpose and Questions
Logic suggests hospitals receiving national quality awards have lower levels of
medical errors and better performance on quality indicators; however, the literature does
not indicate whether this is the case. The purpose of this study was to better understand
the differences between national quality award-winning hospitals and their clinical
performance outcomes on specific variables as compared to non-national quality awardwinning hospitals. This study also examined the difference between the earlier profiled
three high-risk departments of these hospitals and whether there is a difference in
performance between hospitals in these departments.
The Research Questions are as follows:
1. Do hospitals that have won national quality awards (Malcolm Baldrige and/or
Distinguished Clinical Excellence Award) have higher scores in specific key
quality performance variables (clinical excellence) than non-national awardwinning hospitals?
2. Do Obstetric Departments in hospitals that have won national quality awards
(Malcolm Baldrige and/or Distinguished Clinical Excellence Award) have
higher scores in specific key quality performance variables (clinical
excellence) than Obstetric Departments in non-national award-winning
hospitals?
76
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3. Do Operating Departments in hospitals that have won national quality awards
(Malcolm Baldrige and/or Distinguished Clinical Excellence Award) have
higher scores in specific key quality performance variables (clinical
excellence) than Operating Departments in non-national award-winning
hospitals?
4. Do Emergency Departments in hospitals that have won national quality
awards (Malcolm Baldrige and/or Distinguished Clinical Excellence Award)
have higher scores in specific key quality performance variables (clinical
excellence) than Emergency Departments in non-national award-winning
hospitals?
Description of Data
Human Subjects Institution Review Board approval was obtained to conduct this
research under the exempt category; a copy of the approval letter is included in Appendix
D. Data from the Medicare Hospital Compare database from the year ending 2014 were
downloaded for analysis in this project. There are 86 variables collected in the database;
50 of them are related to timely and effective care. Out of the Timely and Effective Care
category, 11 variables were selected as key quality indicators for use in this project. They
were selected based on literature review and a review of the professional medical
associations and societies in the United States that outline quality indicators.
There are 4,861 healthcare organizations that report into the Medicare Hospital
Compare database. Not all, however, offer the same services; therefore, any reporting
organization that had missing data for six or more of the selected key quality variables
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was excluded from analysis. This resulted in 3,118 healthcare organizations that were
eligible for analysis in this study.
The healthcare organizations were then separated into two groups, national
quality award-winning, represented in the data analysis with a 1, and non-national quality
award-winning represented in the data analysis with a 0. Those hospitals having received
the Malcolm Baldrige Quality Award for Healthcare and/or the Healthgrades
Distinguished Hospital for Clinical Excellence Award were identified as national quality
award-winning. All others were identified as non-national quality award-winning. When
a Malcolm Baldrige Award-Winning system occurred, all hospitals within that system
were depicted as a national quality award winner. There were 493 identified national
quality award-winning organizations and 2,625 non-national quality award-winning
organizations. Of the 493 national quality award-winning organizations, 11 have received
both awards.
Data Analysis Process and Results
Using SPSS version 22, each variable was evaluated separately using a twosample (independent) t test analysis or Mann–Whitney U tests as applicable at the .05
level of significance. When using an independent t test analysis, there are six assumptions
that need to be met in order to determine whether using the analysis is appropriate or if
another test should be used. Those assumptions are (1) there is a continuous dependent
variable; (2) the independent variable is categorical with two groups; (3) there are
independent observations (meaning there are no cases in which they would be listed in
both categories); (4) there should be no significant outliers; (5) the dependent variable
should be approximately normally distributed for each group of the independent variable;
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and 6) there is homogeneity of variances, meaning the variance is equal in each group of
the independent variable (Laerd Statistics, 2015). Should the variable fail to adhere to any
of the assumptions for the independent t test, then a non-parametric Mann–Whitney U
test was conducted. Table 8 provides an overview of the statistical analysis for each of
the variables. Additional statistical analysis charts can be found in Appendix E.

Table 8
Overview of Statistical Analysis
Variable

National Quality
Award-Winning Hospitals
Mann–Whitney U Test

Non-National Quality
Award-Winning Hospitals
Mann–Whitney U Test

PCI %

Median = 98%
M = 95.78%
U = 209,961
z = 1.137
p = .255
Mean Rank 771.79
N = 353

Median = 98%
M = 95.50%
U = 209,961
z = 1.137
p = .255
Mean Rank 742.63
N = 1145

ECG Minutes

Median = 7 minutes
M = 7.84 minutes
U = 104,413
z = .578
p = .564
Mean Rank 874.4
N = 129

Median = 7 minutes
M = 7.85 minutes
U = 104,413
z = .578
p = .564
Mean Rank 848.5
N = 1571

ACE I %

Median = 100%
M = 97.8%
U = 464,138
z = 2.099
p = .036
Mean Rank 1,328.61
N = 414

Median = 100%
M = 96.57%
U = 464,138
z = 2.099
p = .036
Mean Rank 1251.95
N = 2114,

PNEU %

Median = 98%
M = 97.36%
U = 635,019
z = 4.795
p = .000
Mean Rank 1,722.45
N = 420

Median = 97%
M = 95.84%
U = 635,019
z = 4.795
p = .000
Mean Rank 1,501.74
N = 2643
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Table 8—Continued
Variable

National Quality
Award-Winning Hospitals
Mann–Whitney U Test

Non-National Quality
Award-Winning Hospitals
Mann–Whitney U Test

Blood Glucose %

Median = 97%
M = 94.91%
U = 109,861
z = 1.493
p = .135
Mean Rank 531.97
N = 281

Median = 96%
M = 93.92%
U = 109,861
z = 1.493
p = .135
Mean Rank 501.64
N = 738

Urinary Cath %

Median = 99%
M = 97.97%
U = 584,049
z = 2.951
p = .003
Mean Rank 1,601.09
N = 420

Median = 99%
M = 96.79%
U = 584,049
z = 2.951
p = .003
Mean Rank 1,470.59
N = 2557

Clots %

Median = 99%
M = 98.96%
U = 632,221.5
z = 4.516
p = .000
Mean Rank 1,715.79
N = 420

Median = 99%
M = 98.03%
U = 632,221.5
z = 4.516
p = .000
Mean Rank 1,512.82
N = 2660

a

OB %

Median = 2%
M = 3.46%
U = 343,569.5
z = 3.212
p = .001
Mean Rank 1,112.06
N = 371

Median = 3%
M = 5.09%
U = 343,569.5
z = 3.212
p = .001
Mean Rank 1,237.62
N = 2065

a

ED Minutes

Median = 290 minutes
M = 299.3 minutes
U = 674,939
z = 7.467
p = .000
Mean Rank 1,820.93
N = 419

Median = 259 minutes
M = 277.35 minutes
U = 674,939
z = 7.467
p = .000
Mean Rank 1,475.48
N = 2626

a

AntiTime %

Median = 99%
M = 97.89%
U = 504,593.5
z = 2.366
p = .018
Mean Rank 1,464.65
N = 399

Median = 98%
M = 96.75%
U = 504,593.5
z = 2.366
p = .018
Mean Rank 1,364.51
N = 2358
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Table 8—Continued
Variable

National Quality
Award-Winning Hospitals
Mann–Whitney U Test

a

AntiKind %

a

Variables assigned to high-risk departments

Median = 99%
M = 97.91%
U = 577,873
z = 1.879
p = .060
Mean Rank 1,589.17
N = 419

Non-National Quality
Award-Winning Hospitals
Mann–Whitney U Test
Median = 98%
M = 97.0%
U = 577,873
z = 1.879
p = .060
Mean Rank 1,504.26
N = 2612

Overall Variables
RQ 1: Do hospitals that have won national quality awards (Malcolm Baldrige
and/or Distinguished Clinical Excellence Award) have higher scores in key quality
performance variables (clinical excellence) than non-national award-winning hospitals?
This question focuses on all 11 variables selected through literature review and
searches of professional associations and societies in the medical field that examine
quality indicators. Seven of the 11 variables show a statistically significant difference in
the mean or median outcome performance of national quality award-winning hospitals as
compared to non-national award-winning hospitals (ACEI %, p = .036; Pneu %, p =
.000; Urinary Cath %, p = .003; Clots %, p = .000; OB %, p = .001; ED Minutes, p =
.000; AntiTime %, p = .018). Six out of the seven variables show a statistically
significant higher score, while only the Emergency Department minutes variables shows
a statistically significant lower score for national quality award-winning hospitals, which
will be discussed more in Chapter V.
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The findings suggest that, overall for these specific key variables, hospitals that
have received a national quality award perform better on more of the identified key
quality variables than non-national award-winning hospitals. Additionally, those
variables assigned to the high-risk departments show statistically significant difference in
performance, some better, some not, between national quality award-winning hospitals
and non-national quality award-winning hospitals. More on these specific variables will
be discussed as well.
PCI % Variable
The PCI % variable is the percentage of patients having a heart attack that are
given percutaneous coronary intervention within 90 minutes of arrival of the hospital.
Findings from the Mann–Whitney U tests analysis indicate there is no statistically
significant difference between national quality award-winning hospitals and non-national
quality award-winning hospitals in the performance outcome of this variable (p = .255).
In order to determine whether the independent t test analysis is appropriate to use
for this variable, the last three assumptions need to be examined. First, there should be no
major outliers. This variable, as seen in Figure 2, shows numerous outliers, which in turn
means that the data will not be normally distributed. Because both the outlier assumption
and the normality of distribution assumption were not met, this variable was transformed
to determine if the distribution of the data could be normalized. The transformation
computation applied reflect and inverse transformation; however, the data still continued
to be skewed to the left. Therefore, it is determined the independent t test is no longer the
most appropriate analysis, and a non-parametric Mann–Whitney U test is most
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appropriate because the Mann–Whitney U test can handle skewed normality of data
distribution issues.

Figure 2. Box plot for PCI % variable.
The data for this variable satisfied the assumptions of the Mann–Whitney U test
(the dependent variable is continuous; there is one independent variable with two
categories; cases cannot be in both categories; whether the distribution of data has the
same shape).
Distribution of the PCI scores for national award-winning hospitals and nonnational award-winning hospitals were similar, as assessed by virtual inspection. PCI
scores for non-national award-winning hospitals (mean rank 742.63) and national award-
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winning (mean rank 771.79) were not statistically different, U = 209,961; z = 1.137,
p = .255. The median for national quality award-winning hospitals percentage of patients
that receive PCI within 90 minutes of arrival is 98% and the mean is 95.78%. The median
for non-national quality award-winning hospitals percentage of patients that receive PCI
within 90 minutes of arrival is 97% and the mean is 95.5%.
After conducting multiple tests on this variable, it is concluded there is no
statistically significant differences between the medians of the national award-winning
hospitals and non-national award-winning hospitals in heart attack patients given PCI
within 90 minutes of arrival at the hospital.
EKG Minutes Variable
The EKG minutes variable is the average number of minutes before and EKG
(electrocardiogram, also referred to as ECG) is completed for patients complaining of
chest pains. Findings from the analysis indicate there is no statistically significant
difference in the median performance outcome between national quality award-winning
hospitals and non-national quality award-winning hospitals for this variable using the
Mann–Whitney U test (p = .564). Examination of the data for assumptions #4 (outliers),
#5 (normality of distribution), and #6 (homogeneity of variances) was conducted.
Boxplots for this variable indicate outliers in the data as shown below in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Boxplot for EKG Minutes variable.
With the numerous outliers in these data, it is known that the data are also not
normally distributed. Visual assessment of the histograms and Q-Q plots show a skew to
the right.
Because of the violations of assumption #4 (outliers) and #5 (normality of
distribution) transformation of the variable was computed as skewed data to the right,
using logarithmic transformation. Re-evaluation of the variable indicated that outliers still
existed in the data, and the data were still not normally distributed.
With these continued violations in assumptions, the most appropriate analysis is
the Mann–Whitney U test. The Mann–Whitney U test addresses the problem of violating
the normality of distribution because it examines medians in a rank order. Therefore, this
analysis was run to determine if there were differences in the median between national
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award-winning hospitals and non-national award-winning hospitals. The data satisfied the
assumptions of the Mann–Whitney U test (the dependent variable is continuous; there is
one independent variable with two categories; cases cannot be in both categories; whether
the distribution of data has the same shape).
Distribution of the EKG scores for national award-winning hospitals and nonnational award-winning hospitals were similar, as assessed by virtual inspection. EKG
scores for non-national award-winning hospitals (mean rank 848.5) and national awardwinning (mean rank 874.4) were not statistically different, U = 104,413; z = .578. p =
.564. The median time to EKG for non-national award-winning hospitals is 7 minutes and
the mean time is 7.84 minutes. The median time to EKG for national award-winning
hospitals is 7 minutes and the mean time is 7.85 minutes.
After conducting multiple tests on this variable it is concluded there is no
statistically significant differences between the medians of the national award-winning
hospitals and non-national award-winning hospitals in the EKG time variable.
ACE Inhibitor % Variable
The ACE inhibitor % variable is the percentage of heart failure patients given an
ACE (angiotensin converting enzyme) inhibitor or ARB (angiotensin receptor blockers)
for left ventricular systolic dysfunction. Findings indicate there is a statistically
significant difference between the medians of national quality award-winning hospitals
and non-national quality award-winning hospitals for this variable (p = .036).
Examination of the data for assumptions #4 (outliers), #5 (normality of distribution), and
#6 (homogeneity of variances) was conducted. Boxplots for this variable indicate outliers
in the data as shown below in Figure 4.
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With the numerous outliers, the data are not normally distributed. A visual
assessment of the histograms indicates the data are skewed to the left.
With violations of assumptions #4 (outliers), #5 (normal distribution) and #6
(homogeneity of variance), a transformation computation was done on this variable.
Because of the skewed data to the left, reflect and inverse transformation was done. Reexamination of this variable indicated no outliers; however, the normality of distribution
was still not met as assessed by Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality (p = .000), and
homogeneity of variance was still not met as assessed by Levene’s test for equality of
variances (p = .000).

Figure 4. Boxplot for ACE I % variable.
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With these continued violations in assumptions, a Mann–Whitney U test was run
to determine if there were differences in the median between national award-winning
hospitals and non-national award-winning hospitals. The data satisfied the assumptions of
the Mann–Whitney U test (the dependent variable is continuous; there is one independent
variable with two categories; cases cannot be in both categories; whether the distribution
of data has the same shape). Distribution of the ACE inhibitor scores for national awardwinning hospitals and non-national award-winning hospitals were similar, as assessed by
virtual inspection. ACE inhibitor scores for non-national award-winning hospitals (mean
rank 1,251.95) and national award-winning (mean rank 1,328.61) were statistically
different, U = 464,138; z = 2.099. p = .036. The median percentage of heart failure
patients to receive ACE inhibitors for non-national award-winning hospitals is 100% and
the mean is 96.57%. The median percentage of heart failure patients to receive ACE
inhibitors for national award-winning hospitals is 100% and the mean is 97.8%.
The Mann–Whitney U test ranks all the observations and then sums the ranks
from one of the groups and compares it to the expected rank sum. With a sufficiently
large sample size the difference in ranks will be large enough to be statistically
significant even when the medians are equal (Laerd Statistics, 2015). From examination
of the means in this variable, however, we see that the percentage of heart failure patients
receiving ACE inhibitors in non-national quality award-winning hospitals is considerably
lower than national quality award-winning hospitals. The outliers in the boxplot shown
above indicates there are a number of hospitals in the non-national quality award-winning
category performing at a lower level than national quality award-winning hospitals and
bringing down the mean for the group, even though the medians are the same.
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Results from the initial run of the independent t test showed statistically
significant differences in the means of this variable. Yet the transformation did not
provide relief from the violations of assumptions for the independent t test for normal
distribution.
After conducting multiple tests on this variable it is concluded that the results of
the Mann–Whitney U tests indicate statistical significance in the median of the national
award-winning hospitals and non-national award-winning hospitals in the ACE inhibitor
percentage variable. While the medians for each category are the same at 100%, the mean
ranks and the means indicate better performance outcomes for national award-winning
hospitals in this variable.
Pneumonia % Variable
The pneumonia % variable refers to the percentage of pneumonia patients that
were given the most appropriate initial antibiotic. Findings indicate there is a statistically
significant difference between the medians of national quality award-winning hospitals
and non-national quality award-winning hospitals in performance outcome for this
variable (p = .000). Examination of the data for assumptions #4 (outliers), #5 (normality
of distribution), and #6 (homogeneity of variances) was conducted. Boxplots for this
variable indicate numerous outliers in the data as shown in Figure 5.

90

Figure 5. Boxplot for Pneumonia % variable.

With the numerous outliers the data also shows a non-normal distribution.
Visualization of the histogram showed skewed data to the left. With the violations to
assumptions #4 (outliers), #5 (normality of distribution) and #6 (homogeneity of
variances), a transformation computation of the variable was conducted as reflect and
inverse transformation computation. During re-examination of the data, it was found that
outliers remained and the data still did not meet the assumption of normal distribution.
With these continued violations in assumptions, a Mann–Whitney U test was run
to determine if there were differences in the median between national quality awardwinning hospitals and non-national quality award-winning hospitals. The data satisfied
the assumptions of the Mann–Whitney U test (the dependent variable is continuous; there
is one independent variable with two categories; cases cannot be in both categories;
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whether the distribution of data has the same shape). Distribution of the pneumonia %
scores for national quality award-winning hospitals and non-national quality award
hospitals were similar, as assessed by virtual inspection. Pneumonia % scores for national
quality award-winning hospitals (mean rank 1,722.45) and non-national quality awardwinning hospitals (mean rank 1,501.74) were statistically different, U = 635,019; z =
4.795; p = .000. The median percentage of pneumonia patients receiving the appropriate
initial antibiotic for national quality award-winning hospitals is 98% and the mean is
97.36%. The median percentage of pneumonia patients receiving the appropriate initial
antibiotic for non-national award-winning hospitals is 97% and the mean is 95.84%.
Therefore, it is concluded there is a significant difference in the medians of percentage of
pneumonia patients receiving the appropriate initial antibiotic in national quality awardwinning hospitals as compared to non-national quality award-winning hospitals. With a
better performance outcome from national quality award-winning hospitals.
Blood Glucose % Variable
The blood glucose % variable refers to heart surgery patients whose blood glucose
is kept under control in the days after surgery. Findings indicate there is no statistically
significant difference between the median for national quality award-winning hospitals
and non-national quality award-winning hospitals in the performance outcome of this
variable (p = .135). Examination of the data for assumptions #4 (outliers), #5 (normality
of distribution), and #6 (homogeneity of variances) was conducted. Boxplots for this
variable indicate numerous outliers in the data as shown in Figure 6.
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Figure 6. Boxplot for Blood Glucose % variable.
With the numerous outliers we can see the data are not normally distributed as
well. Finally, the assumption of homogeneity of variances is not met as assessed by
Levene’s test for equality of variances (p = .002). Visualization of the histogram showed
skewed data to the left.
With the violations in assumption #4 (outliers), #5 (normal distribution), and #6
(homogeneity in variances), and skewed data to the left, a transformation computation
was done with the variable as reflect and logarithmic transformation. Re-examination of
the variable indicated no outliers within the group. However data were still not normally
distributed as assessed by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality (p = .000).
With these continued violations in assumptions, a Mann–Whitney U test was run
to determine if there were differences in the median between national quality award-
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winning hospitals and non-national quality award-winning hospitals. The data satisfied
the assumptions of the Mann–Whitney U test (the dependent variable is continuous; there
is one independent variable with two categories; cases cannot be in both categories;
whether the distribution of data has the same shape). Distribution of the blood sugar %
scores for national quality award-winning hospitals and non-national quality award
hospitals were similar, as assessed by virtual inspection. Blood sugar % scores for
national quality award-winning hospitals (mean rank 531.97) and non-national quality
award-winning hospitals (mean rank 501.64) were not statistically different, U =
109,861.5; z = 1.493; p = .135. The median percentage of heart surgery patients whose
blood sugar was kept under control in the days following surgery for national quality
award-winning hospitals is 97% and the mean is 94.91%. The median percentage of heart
surgery patients whose blood sugar was kept under control in the days following surgery
for non-national award-winning hospitals is 96% and the mean is 93.92%. With the
violations of assumptions in the independent t test it is determined that the Mann–
Whitney U test is more appropriate. Therefore, it is concluded there is not a significant
difference in the medians of percentage of heart surgery patients whose blood sugar was
kept under control in the days following surgery in national quality award-winning
hospitals as compared to non-national quality award-winning hospitals.
Urinary Catheters % Variable
The urinary catheters % variable refers to surgery patients whose urinary catheters
were removed on the first or second day of surgery. Findings indicate there is a
statistically significant difference in the median performance outcome between national
quality award-winning hospitals and non-national quality award-winning hospitals for
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this variable (p = .003). Examination of the data for assumptions #4 (outliers), #5
(normality of distribution), and #6 (homogeneity of variances) was conducted. Boxplots
for this variable indicate numerous outliers in the data as shown in Figure 7.
With the numerous outliers, a non-normal distribution of data occurs as well.
Visualization of the histogram showed data skewed to the left. With the violations in
assumption #4 (outliers), #5 (normal distribution), and #6 (homogeneity in variances),
and skewed data to the left, a transformation computation was done with the variable as
reflect and logarithmic transformation. Re-examination of the variable indicated outliers
remained in the data, and data were still not normally distributed.

Figure 7. Boxplot for Urinary Catheter % variable.
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With these continued violations in assumptions, a Mann–Whitney U test was run
to determine if there were differences in the median between national quality awardwinning hospitals and non-national quality award-winning hospitals. The data satisfied
the assumptions of the Mann–Whitney U test (the dependent variable is continuous; there
is one independent variable with two categories; cases cannot be in both categories;
whether the distribution of data has the same shape). Distribution of the urine catheter %
scores for national quality award-winning hospitals and non-national quality award
hospitals were similar, as assessed by virtual inspection. Urine catheter % scores for
national quality award-winning hospitals (mean rank 1,601.09) and non-national quality
award-winning hospitals (mean rank 1,470.59) were statistically different, U = 584,049;
z = 2.951; p = .003. The median percentage of surgery patients whose urinary catheters
were removed on the first or second day after surgery for national quality award-winning
hospitals is 99% and the mean is 97.97%. The median percentage of surgery patients
whose urinary catheters were removed on the first or second day after surgery for nonnational award-winning hospitals is 99% and the mean is 96.79%. With the violations of
assumptions in the independent t test it is determined that the Mann–Whitney U test is
more appropriate.
Therefore, it is concluded there is a statistically significant difference in the
medians of percentage of surgery patients whose urinary catheters were removed on the
first or second day after surgery in national quality award-winning hospitals as compared
to non-national quality award-winning hospitals. Again, however, this variable shows
medians that are the same at 99%, so a closely examination of the mean ranks and the
means as well as the boxplot indicates that there are some hospitals in the non-national
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quality award-winning category performing at a very low level in this variable. Bringing
down the mean and indicating the better performance is in the national quality awardwinning hospitals even though the medians are the same.
Blood Clot % Variable
The blood clot % variable refers to surgery patients who received appropriate
venous thromboembolism prophylaxis within 24 hours prior to surgery to 24 hours after
surgery to prevent blood clots. Findings indicate there is a statistically significant
difference in the means in the performance outcome between national quality awardwinning hospitals and non-national quality award-winning hospitals for this variable (p =
.000). Examination of the variable showed for assumptions #4 (outliers), #5 (normality of
distribution), and #6 (homogeneity of variances) showed numerous outliers in the dataset
as assessed by the boxplot shown in Figure 8.
With the numerous outliers, normality of distribution of the data was also not met.
Visualization of the histograms skewed data to the left. With the violations of assumption
#4 (outliers), #5 (normal distribution), and #6 (homogeneity of variance) a transformation
computation of the data was conducted using reflect and inverse transformation. Reevaluation of the variable indicated that no outliers existed in data. However, data were
still not normally distributed as assessed by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality,
p = .000; and data still had not met the assumption of homogeneity of variance, p = .004.
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Figure 8. Boxplot for Blood Clots % variable.

With these continued violations in assumptions to the independent t test, a Mann–
Whitney U test was run to determine if there were differences in the median between
national quality award-winning hospitals and non-national quality award-winning
hospitals. The data satisfied the assumptions of the Mann–Whitney U test (the dependent
variable is continuous; there is one independent variable with two categories; cases
cannot be in both categories; whether the distribution of data has the same shape).
Distribution of the blood clot % scores for national quality award-winning hospitals and
non-national quality award-winning hospitals were similar, as assessed by virtual
inspection. Blood clot % scores for national quality award-winning hospitals (mean rank
1,715.79) and non-national quality award-winning hospitals (mean rank 1,512.82) were
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statistically different, U = 632,221.5; z = 4.516; p = .000. The median percentage of
surgery patients who received appropriate venous thromboembolism prophylaxis within
24 hours prior to surgery to 24 hours after surgery for national award-winning hospitals is
99% and the mean is 98.96%. The median percentage of surgery patients who received
appropriate venous thromboembolism prophylaxis within 24 hours prior to surgery to 24
hours after surgery for non-national quality award-winning hospitals is 99% and the mean
is 98.03%. With the violations to the assumptions for the independent t test it is
determined the Mann–Whitney U test is appropriate.
Therefore, it is concluded there is a significant difference in the medians of
percentage of surgery patients who received appropriate venous thromboembolism
prophylaxis within 24 hours prior to surgery to 24 hours after surgery in national quality
award-winning hospitals as compared to non-national quality award-winning hospitals.
Again, this variable indicates the same medians for both categories of hospitals. In further
examination of the mean ranks and means as well as the boxplot there are a few hospitals
in the non-national quality award-winning category that are performing low in this
variable and the better performance is in hospitals that have received the national quality
awards.
Obstetrics Department
RQ 2: Do Obstetric Departments in hospitals that have won national quality
awards (Malcolm Baldrige and/or Distinguished Clinical Excellence Award) have higher
scores in key quality performance variables (clinical excellence) than Obstetric
Departments in non-national award-winning hospitals?
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This research question focuses on the one obstetrics variable collected in the study
which examines the percentage of births that were delivered 1–3 weeks early either by
induction or caesarean section when it was not medically necessary. The findings show
that hospitals that have received national quality awards (Median–2%; p = .000) have a
statistically significant lower percentage (a better score) than non-national quality awardwinning hospitals (Median–3%; p = .000).
The variable directly linked to the high-risk Obstetrics Department is the
percentage of newborns whose deliveries were scheduled too early when it was not
medically necessary, either by induction or caesarean section. Findings indicate there is a
statistically significant difference in the median performance outcome for national quality
award-winning hospitals and non-national quality award-winning hospitals for this
variable (p = .001). Upon examination of the variable for the additional assumptions of
the independent t test, it was found that numerous outliers were present in the data as
shown in Figure 9.
With the numerous outliers, there was not normal distribution of the data.
Visualization of the histograms showed skewed data to the right.
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Figure 9. Boxplot for OB % variable.

With the violations of assumption #4 (outliers), #5 (normal distribution), and #6
(homogeneity of variance), a transformation computation of the data was conducted using
inverse transformation. Re-evaluation of the variable indicated that outliers still existed in
data, and that the data were still not normally distributed. With these continued violations
in assumptions to the independent t test, a Mann–Whitney U test was run to determine if
there were differences in the median between national quality award-winning hospitals
and non-national quality award-winning hospitals. The data satisfied the assumptions of
the Mann–Whitney U test (the dependent variable is continuous; there is one independent
variable with two categories; cases cannot be in both categories; whether the distribution
of data has the same shape). Distribution of the OB % scores for national quality award-
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winning hospitals and non-national quality award-winning hospitals were similar, as
assessed by virtual inspection. OB % scores for national quality award-winning hospitals
(mean rank 1,112.06) and non-national quality award-winning hospitals (mean rank
1,237.62) were statistically different, U = 343,569.5; z = –3.212; p = .001. The median
percentage of newborns whose deliveries were scheduled too early when it was not
medically necessary for national quality award-winning hospitals is 2% and the mean is
3.46%. The median percentage of newborns whose deliveries were scheduled too early
when it was not medically necessary for non-national quality award-winning hospitals is
3% and the mean is 5.08%. With the violations to the assumptions for the independent
t test, it is determined the Mann–Whitney U test is appropriate. Therefore, it is concluded
there is a significant difference in the medians of percentage of newborns whose
deliveries were scheduled too early when it was not medically necessary in national
quality award-winning hospitals as compared to non-national quality award-winning
hospitals.
Operating Department
RQ 3: Do Operating Departments in hospitals that have won national quality
awards (Malcolm Baldrige and/or Distinguished Clinical Excellence Award) have higher
scores in key quality performance variables (clinical excellence) than Operating
Departments in non-national award-winning hospitals?
This research question examines two variables that are directly linked to the
Operating Department. Patients that receive the right kind of antibiotic prior to surgery,
and at the right time prior to surgery. These two variables are linked specifically to the
Operating Department because they occur within that department, whereas the blood
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glucose variable, for example, may be more attributable to the floor unit than the
operating unit. The antibiotic timing variable showed a statistically significant difference
in better performance in the percentage of patients that receive an antibiotic prior to
surgery at the correct time for national quality award-winning hospitals (Median–99%; M
= 97.89%; p = .018) and non-national quality award-winning hospitals (Median–98%; M
= 96.75%; p = .018). However, while the median percentage of patients that received the
right kind of antibiotic prior to surgery is higher in national quality award-winning
hospitals (Median–99%; M = 97.91%; p = .060) than non-national quality awardwinning hospitals (Median–98%; M = 97%; p = .060), it is not statistically significant.
There are two variables in this project attributed to the Operating Department,
receiving the correct kind of antibiotic prior to surgery, at the correct time. Findings
indicate that there is a statistically significant difference between the median performance
outcome between national quality award-winning hospitals and non-national quality
award-winning hospitals when looking at timing of antibiotics prior to surgery (p = .018).
However, there is no statistically significant difference between the mean performance
outcome between national quality award-winning hospitals and non-national quality
award-winning hospitals when looking at the type or kind of antibiotic given before
surgery (p = .060). These variables were examined for the remaining assumptions of the
independent t test, outliers, normality of distribution, and homogeneity of variances.
Evaluation of these variables revealed the following: both the correct kind of antibiotic
and the correct time variables showed numerous outliers in the dataset as examined by
boxplots shown in Figure 10 and Figure 11.
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Figure 10. Boxplot for Antibiotic Time % variable.

Figure 11. Boxplot for Antibiotic Kind % variable.
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With the numerous outliers in both variables, normal distribution of data was not
met for either variable. Visualization of the histograms data skewed to the left as shown
below for both variables. With the violations to assumptions #4 (outliers), #5 (normality
of distribution), and #6 (homogeneity of variances), transformation computations for both
variables were completed for skewed data to the left using reflect and inverse
transformation. Re-examination of the data showed outliers remained, and the normality
of distribution for both variables was still not met.
With these continued violations to the assumptions of the independent t test, a
Mann–Whitney U test was done to determine if there were differences in the median
between national quality award-winning hospitals and non-national quality awardwinning hospitals for both variables. The data in both variables satisfied the assumptions
of the Mann–Whitney U test (the dependent variable is continuous; there is one
independent variable with two categories; cases cannot be in both categories; whether the
distribution of data has the same shape). Distribution of the antibiotic kind and time
scores for national quality award-winning hospitals and non-national quality awardwinning hospitals were similar, as assessed by virtual inspection. Antibiotic kind scores
for national quality award-winning hospitals (mean rank 1,589.17) and non-national
quality award-winning hospitals (mean rank 1,504.26) were not statistically different,
U = 577,873; z = 1.879; p = .060. The median percentage of patients having surgery who
got the right kind of antibiotic is 99% for national quality award-winning hospitals and
the mean is 97.91%. The median percentage of patients having surgery who got the right
kind of antibiotic for all other hospitals is 98% and the mean is 97%. Antibiotic time
scores for national quality award-winning hospitals (mean rank 1,464.65) and
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non-national quality award-winning hospitals (mean rank 1,364.51) were statistically
different, U = 504,593.5; z = 2.366; p = .018. The median percentage of patients having
surgery who got the antibiotic at the right time prior to surgery is 99% for national quality
award-winning hospitals and the mean is 97.89%. The median percentage of patients
having surgery who got the antibiotic at the right time prior to surgery for all other
hospitals is 98% and the mean is 96.75%.
With the violations to the assumptions for the independent t test, it is determined
the Mann–Whitney U test is appropriate. Therefore, it is concluded there is a statistically
significant difference in the median of percentage of surgery patients who receive an
antibiotic at the right time prior to surgery in national quality award-winning hospitals as
compared to non-national quality award-winning hospitals. However, there is not a
statistically significant difference in the median percentage of surgery patients who
received the right kind of antibiotic in national quality award-winning hospitals as
compared to non-national quality award-winning hospitals.
Emergency Department
RQ 4: Do Emergency Departments in hospitals that have won national quality
awards (Malcolm Baldrige and/or Distinguished Clinical Excellence Award) have higher
scores in key quality performance variables (clinical excellence) than Emergency
Departments in non-national award-winning hospitals?
This variable examines the average number of minutes a patient spends in the
Emergency Department prior to being admitted to the hospital as an inpatient if that is the
appropriate course of action. In this variable there is a statistically significant difference
between the median in national quality award-winning hospitals (Median–290; p = .000)
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and non-national quality award-winning hospitals (Median–259; p = .000); however, we
see it is the non-national quality award-winning hospital that has as the lower (and better)
score.
There are many variables that can be linked to the Emergency Department;
however, for purposes of this study the variable is the average time patients in the
Emergency Department before they were admitted to the hospital as an inpatient. This
variable does not examine patients that only needed to be treated and sent home, but
looks at the ones that were sick enough to be admitted and the average time the spent in
the Emergency Department before that happened. Findings indicate there is a statistically
significant difference in the mean performance outcome between national quality awardwinning hospitals and non-national quality award-winning hospitals (p = .000). However,
the lower time occurs within non-national quality award-winning hospitals. Examination
of the variable for assumption #4 (outliers), #5 (normal distribution), and #6
(homogeneity of variances) revealed that there were numerous outliers in the dataset as
shown in Figure 12.
With the numerous outliers, normality of distribution of data was not met.
Visualization of the histograms indicated skewed data to the right. With the violations in
assumptions #4 (outliers), #5 (normality of distribution), and #6 (homogeneity of
variances), the variable was transformed using a computation for skewed data to the
right, a square root computation. Re-examination of the variable revealed, outliers still
existed in the data, and normality of distribution was still not met.
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Figure 12. Boxplot for ED Minutes variable.

With the continued violations in the transformed variable, it was decided that a
Mann–Whitney U test should be conducted to determine if there were differences in the
median between national quality award-winning hospitals and non-national quality
award-winning hospitals. The data satisfied the assumptions of the Mann–Whitney U test
(the dependent variable is continuous; there is one independent variable with two
categories; cases cannot be in both categories; whether the distribution of data has the
same shape).
Distribution of the ED time scores for national quality award-winning hospitals
and non-national quality award-winning hospitals were similar, as assessed by virtual
inspection. ED time scores for national quality award-winning hospitals (mean rank
1,820.83) and non-national quality award hospitals (mean rank 1,475.48) were
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statistically different, U = 674,939; z = 7.467; p = .000. The median time patients spent in
the Emergency Department before they were admitted to the hospital as an inpatient for
national quality award-winning hospitals is 290 minutes and the mean is 299.3 minutes.
The median time patients spent in the Emergency Department before they were admitted
to the hospital as an inpatient for non-national quality award-winning hospitals is 259
minutes and the mean is 277.35 minutes. With the violations to the assumptions for the
independent t test, it is determined the Mann–Whitney U test is appropriate. Therefore, it
is concluded there is a significant difference in the median of time patients spent in the
Emergency Department before they were admitted to the hospital as an inpatient for
national quality award-winning hospitals as compared to non-national quality awardwinning hospitals.
Malcolm Baldrige and Healthgrades Award Analysis
Additional analyses which separated out the award-winning hospitals into
Malcolm Baldrige only and Healthgrades only categories yielded interesting findings.
The statistical findings can be seen in Table 9 and Table 10 below. Findings indicate
there are three variables with statistical significant difference between Malcolm Baldrige
winners and all other hospitals (PCI %, p = .002; Urinary Cath %, p = .027; Clots %,
p = .001), while for Healthgrades Distinguished Hospitals for Clinical Excellence Award
winners, findings indicate there are six variables with statistical significant differences
between their ratings and all other hospitals (Pneu %, p = .000; Urinary Cath %, p =
.011; Clots %, p = .000; OB %, p = .001; ED minutes, p = .000; Anti Time %, p = .036).
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Table 9
Statistical Gindings of Malcolm Baldrige Award Winners
Variable

MB National Quality
Award-Winning Hospitals
Mann–Whitney U Test

Non-National Quality
Award-Winning Hospitals
Mann–Whitney U Test

PCI %

Median = 100%
M = 98.13%
U = 23,495.5
z = 3.166
p = .002
Mean Rank 773.92
N = 31

Median = 97%
M = 95.52%
U = 23,495.5
z = 3.166
p = .002
Mean Rank 583.48
N = 1467

ECG Minutes

Median = 7 minutes
M = 7.35 minutes
U = 13,682.5
z = .176
p = .861
Mean Rank 813.85
N = 17

Median = 7 minutes
M = 7.86 minutes
U = 13,682.5
z = .176
p = .861
Mean Rank 794.29
N = 1683

ACE I %

Median = 100%
M = 97.81%
U = 44,442.5
z = 1.530
p = .126
Mean Rank 1,220.15
N = 37

Median = 100%
M = 96.76%
U = 44,442.5
z = 1.530
p = .126
Mean Rank 1,073.48
N = 2491

PNEU %

Median = 98%
M = 97.56%
U = 62,830.5
z = 1.772
p = .076
Mean Rank 1,553.46
N = 41

Median = 97%
M = 96.03%
U = 62,830.5
z = 1.772
p = .076
Mean Rank 1,339.23
N = 3022

Blood Glucose %

Median = 96%
M = 94.43%
U = 8,436.5
z = –.049
p = .961
Mean Rank 378.80
N = 23

Median = 96%
M = 94.19%
U = 8,436.5
z = –.049
p = .961
Mean Rank 381.07
N = 996
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Table 9—Continued
Variable

MB National Quality
Award-Winning Hospitals
Mann–Whitney U Test

Non-National Quality
Award-Winning Hospitals
Mann–Whitney U Test

Urinary Cath %

Median = 99%
M = 98.22%
U = 62,746.5
z = 2.218
p = .027
Mean Rank 1,551.40
N = 41

Median = 99%
M = 96.94%
U = 62,746.5
z = 2.218
p = .027
Mean Rank 1,295.46
N = 2936

Clots %

Median = 100%
M = 99.32%
U = 69,853.5
z = 3.207
p = .001
Mean Rank 1,724.74
N = 41

Median = 99%
M = 98.14%
U = 69,835.5
z = 3.207
p = .001
Mean Rank 1,345.24
N = 3039

OB %

Median = 2%
M = 3.58%
U = 38,445.5
z = –.603
p = .546
Mean Rank 1,152.91
N = 40

Median = 3%
M = 4.86%
U = 45,296.5
z = –.603
p = .546
Mean Rank 1,219.59
N = 2396

ED Minutes

Median = 264 minutes
M = 266.2 minutes
U = 51,064.5
z = –.566
p = .571
Mean Rank 1,266.48
N = 41

Median = 259 minutes
M = 280.56
U = 51,064.5
z = –.566
p = .571
Mean Rank 1,335.05
N = 3004

AntiTime %

Median = 99%
M = 98.0%
U = 56,213.5
z = 1.823
p = .068
Mean Rank 1,392.06
N = 41

Median = 98%
M = 96.9%
U = 56,213.5
z = 1.823
p = .068
Mean Rank 1196.66
N = 2716

AntiKind %

Median = 99%
M = 98.12%
U = 58,245.5
z = .984
p = .325
Mean Rank 1,441.62
N = 41

Median = 98%
M = 97.11%
U = 58,245.5
z = .984
p = .325
Mean Rank 1,325.20
N = 2990
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Table 10
Statistical Findings of Healthgrades Award Winners
Variable

National Quality
Award-Winning Hospitals
Mann–Whitney U Test

Non-National Quality
Award-Winning Hospitals
Mann–Whitney U Test

PCI %

Median = 98%
M = 95.68%
U = 196,648.5
z = .725
p = .468
Mean Rank 755.01
N = 335

Median = 97%
M = 95.54%
U = 196,648.5
z = .725
p = .468
Mean Rank 736.25
N = 1,162

ECG Minutes

Median = 8 minutes
M = 7.94 minutes
U = 95,592
z = .740
p = .459
Mean Rank 876.03
N = 117

Median = 7 minutes
M = 7.83 minutes
U = 95,592
z = .740
p = .459
Mean Rank 841.61
N = 1,582

ACE I %

Median = 100%
M = 97.79%
U = 435,301.5
z = 1.888
p = .059
Mean Rank 1,311.66
N = 390

Median = 100%
M = 96.59%
U = 435,305.1
z = 1.888
p = .059
Mean Rank 1,241.59
N = 2137

PNEU %

Median = 98%
M = 97.34%
U = 590,588
z = 4.523
p = .000
Mean Rank 1,703.10
N = 392

Median = 97%
M = 95.86%
U = 590,588
z = 4.523
p = .000
Mean Rank 1,490.55
N = 2670

Blood Glucose %

Median = 97%
M = 94.85%
U = 104,622
z = 1.391
p = .163
Mean Rank 524.88
N = 268

Median = 96%
M = 93.96%
U = 104,622
z = 1.391
p = .163
Mean Rank 496.43
N = 751

Urinary Cath %

Median = 99%
M = 97.94%
U = 540,018
z = 2.532
p = .011
Mean Rank 1,574.10
N = 392

Median = 99%
M = 96.81%
U = 540,018
z = 2.532
p = .011
Mean Rank 1,459.81
N = 2584
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Table 10—Continued
Variable

National Quality
Award-Winning Hospitals
Mann–Whitney U Test

Non-National Quality
Award-Winning Hospitals
Mann–Whitney U Test

Clots %

Median = 99%
M = 98.92%
U = 581,854.5
z = 3.857
p = .000
Mean Rank 1,680.82
N = 392

Median = 99%
M = 98.04%
U = 581,854.5
z = 3.857
p = .000
Mean Rank 1,503.76
N = 2687

OB %

Median = 2%
M = 3.40%
U = 315,215.5
z = 3.396
p = .001
Mean Rank 1,088.82
N = 344

Median = 3%
M = 5.08%
U = 315,215.5
z = 3.396
p = .001
Mean Rank 1,224.35
N = 2091

ED Minutes

Median = 292 minutes
M = 301.77 minutes
U = 640,179
z = 7.891
p = .000
Mean Rank 1,833.29
N = 391

Median = 259 minutes
M = 277.22 minutes
U = 640,179
z = 7.891
p = .000
Mean Rank 1,460.72
N = 2653

AntiTime %

Median = 99%
M = 97.91%
U = 466,410
z = 2.093
p = .036
Mean Rank 1,443.17
N = 371

Median = 98%
M = 96.76%
U = 466,410
z = 2.093
p = .036
Mean Rank 1,352.70
N = 2385

AntiKind %

Median = 99%
M = 97.92%
U = 539,818.5
z = 1.859
p = .063
Mean Rank 1,576.61
N = 391

Median = 98%
M = 97.0%
U = 539,818.5
z = 1.859
p = .063
Mean Rank 1,490.83
N = 2639

Summary
Approval from the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board was obtained and
data collection and analysis followed. Over 3,000 hospitals in the Medicare Hospital
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Compare database were analyzed examining 11 specific variables as key quality
indicators. Those hospitals having received the Malcolm Baldrige and/or Healthgrades
Distinguished Hospital for Clinical Excellence Award were grouped into the national
quality award-winning category; the rest were grouped into the non-national quality
award-winning category. Independent t tests or Mann–Whitney U tests were conducted to
determine if there was statistical significance of the means or medians between the two
groups. When assumptions of the independent t test were violated, the Mann–Whitney
U test was used to examine the medians of the two groups. Findings showed that overall
there were statistically significant better performances in more variables from hospitals
that had received national quality awards than non-national quality award-winning
hospitals. Further examination showed that obstetric departments in national quality
award-winning hospitals had statistically significant better outcomes in their metric
variable than non-national quality award-winning hospitals. While Operating
Departments showed a split in the findings, there was a statistically significant difference
in the percentage of patients that received an antibiotic in the right time prior to surgery
in hospitals that have received national quality awards compared to non-national quality
award-winning hospitals. However, no statistical significance was found in the
percentage of patients who received the right kind of antibiotic prior to surgery between
national quality award-winning hospitals and non-national quality award-winning
hospitals. Finally, there was a statistically significant difference in the median number of
minutes that patients spent in the Emergency Department prior to being admitted as
inpatients between the two categories; however, the better score existed in the nonnational quality award-winning hospitals. Interestingly, when the data were analyzed as
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Malcolm Baldrige Award winners compared to all others, and then again as Healthgrades
Award winners compared to all others, the results indicate Healthgrades Award winners
perform better in more variables than Malcolm Baldrige Award winners. The Malcolm
Baldrige Award-Winning hospitals had statistically significant differences in
performances in 3 out of 11 variables (all 3 being better performing) (see Table 9 above
for results), while the Healthgrades Award-Winning hospitals had statistically significant
differences in performances in 6 out of 11 variables (5 of those being better performing)
(see Table 10 above for results).

CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
Summary of Major Results
The findings of this study suggest that national quality award-winning hospitals
have better performance outcomes on specific quality variables than non-national quality
award-winning hospitals, as collected and reported by the Medicare Hospital Compare
database. The variables specified in this study reflect the percentage of correct
procedures. For some of the variables, the higher the percentage, the more often the
treatment occurred in the correct time and in the correct manner. For one variable (the
OB variable), the lower the percentage, the better the quality. Regardless of which way
the data are reported, the receiving of a national quality award reflects positive action in 6
out of 11 variables examined with only 1 variable exhibiting an opposite relationship.
Overall, this is an expected finding. It is logical that those hospitals that have received
national quality awards are in fact performing better than those that have not because
these hospitals may be functioning more as highly reliable organizations. Research
findings from Pope (2015) support the findings of this study. She found that Malcolm
Baldrige Quality Award-Winning hospitals are not quite yet highly reliable organizations,
but come closer to reflecting an HRO than other hospitals. However, as the data were
analyzed a step further and examined the type of national award received (i.e., either the
Malcolm Baldrige or the Healthgrades Award), findings indicated there are more
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variables with statistically significant better performances in Healthgrades Distinguished
Hospitals for Clinical Excellence recipients than in Malcolm Baldrige recipients.
It can be argued that these national quality award-winning hospitals are emulating
principles of highly reliable organizations, and if other hospitals want to increase safety
and quality, they should look to the indicators of excellence from the Malcolm Baldrige
Award and Healthgrades Awards as they are aligned with principles of highly reliable
organization theory, and how their own organizations fit into that alignment (see Table
4).
Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) explain that HROs make continued efforts to analyze
their systems, looking for errors, near misses, and the dangers of complacency,
continually looking at the sensitivity of their operations and developing situational
awareness for their organization (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). As argued above, those
hospitals receiving national quality awards have invested time and resources into
performance, system improvements, and elements of highly reliable organizations in
order to be recognized as a national quality award winner.
Obstetrics Unit
The findings in the obstetrics variable suggest there is a statistically significant
difference between national quality award-winning hospitals and non-national quality
award-winning hospitals when it comes to early deliveries. As outlined in Chapter II, the
Obstetrics Department is a litigation hotbed, where medical errors do not necessarily
occur frequently, but when they do they are costly. These findings indicate that national
quality award-winning hospitals have a statistically significant lower occurrence
(Median–2%; p = .000) of early deliveries when they were not medically necessary than
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non-national quality award-winning hospitals (Median–3%; p = .000). This finding
makes sense, and could be an indicator of defensive medicine (ordering tests/procedures
or avoiding high-risk patients to avoid liability) in the ideology of doctors in these
hospitals, or could reflect the make-up of patients (privately insured vs. Medicare) in
these hospitals (Shurtz, 2014). Regardless, the Association of Women’s Health, Obstetric
and Neonatal Nurses’ official position statement indicates “reserving induction and
augmentation of labor for pregnant women with medical indications promotes the best
health outcomes for women and infants and is the best use of health care resources”
(AWHONN, 2014, p. 678).
The findings within this unit are consistent with highly reliable organizations in
that the unit is functioning at a level that is sensitive to its operations. Weick and Sutcliffe
(2007) argue that organizations that are sensitive to their operations are more situational
and less strategic. Meaning they are attentive to where the real work gets accomplished
and have well-developed situational awareness (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). This
situational awareness allows obstetric departments to provide care that is safe for the
patients and reflects best practices.
Operating Department
The Operating Department variables consisted of patients that received the right
kind of antibiotic in the right time frame to prevent surgical site infections. The findings
in these two Operating Department variables indicate that national quality award-winning
hospitals have a statistically significant better performance (Median–99%; p = .018)
percentage of patients that receive an antibiotic in the proper time prior to surgery than
non-national quality award-winning hospitals (Median–98%; p = .018). However, there
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is no statistically significant difference in the percentage of patients that receive the right
kind of antibiotic prior to surgery between national quality award-winning hospitals
(Median–99%; p = .060) and non-national quality award-winning hospitals (Median–
98%; p = .060). This finding is somewhat expected because it makes sense that the kind
of antibiotic is not an area of struggle for Operating Departments, but getting the timing
of it can be. Both of these variables are directly controlled by the Operating Department,
the kind and timing of the antibiotic is accomplished by the professionals in this
department.
It is logical that the timing of the antibiotic is statistically significant between
national quality award-winning hospitals and non-national quality award-winning
hospitals, as Operating Departments use checklists to aid in the execution of operations
(Gawande, 2009). It is expected that these national quality award-winning hospitals
would have processes in place that allow for more patients to receive antibiotics in a
timely and effective manner. The kind of antibiotic may not be as impactful, because the
kind is not the issue; the struggle is whether it has come on board at an appropriate time
to help prevent surgical site infections (Mujagic et al., 2014). The findings of these
variables again reflect organizations that are replicating highly reliable organizations.
These organizations are adhering to the sensitivity to operations for a big picture
viewpoint (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007).
Emergency Department
The Emergency Department variable examined the average time patients spent in
the Emergency Department before being admitted as inpatients to the hospitals. The
findings of this variable were somewhat unexpected. National quality award-winning
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hospitals had a statistically significant difference (Median–290; p = .000) in the median
time for these patients; however, it was higher (therefore a poorer) score than nonnational quality award-winning hospitals (Median–259; p = .000). It was expected that
national quality award-winning hospitals would have process and procedures that allowed
for the most effective and expeditious care in the Emergency Department. It was
expected that these hospitals would recognize it is not in the best interest of the patient or
the department to keep patients in the Emergency Department longer than needed (Pham
et al., 2014).
There could be a number of reasons why finding that average number of minutes
spent in the ED prior to admission into the hospital was higher in national quality awardwinning hospitals and was not expected. First, national quality award-winning hospitals
could be providing more testing of patients prior to admitting to the medical floor as an
inpatient, which could inflate the median number of minutes. Second, the national quality
award-winning hospitals could be busier because more people recognize the quality of
their care, which may cause delays in processing patients through the system. Finally,
national quality award-winning hospitals may see sicker patients and with sicker patients
they may be more closely observed in the Emergency Department before being admitted
to the hospital. Having longer times in the Emergency Department prior to admittance to
the hospital for national quality award-winning hospitals may actually be an indicator of
being a highly reliable organization. As Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) note, the second
principle of an HRO is a reluctance to simplify. They take deliberate steps to create more
complete and detailed sketches of what is going on, understanding that situations are
often complex and dynamic. So therefore, by taking longer, the national quality award-
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winning hospitals may in fact be providing more quality of care and emulating HROs
more closely.
Malcolm Baldrige and Healthgrades Individually
As the statistical analyses were re-examined with the specific national quality
award as the dependent variable, it showed that there are more variables with statistically
significant differences in Healthgrades award winners than Malcolm Baldrige Award
winners. This could merely be a difference in the number of Malcolm Baldrige Quality
winners that exist as compared to the number of Healthgrades Distinguished Hospital for
Clinical Excellence Award winners. It could also mean that winning the Malcolm
Baldrige Quality Award is much more of a holistic award focusing on the organization as
a whole rather than outcomes-focused, whereas Healthgrades is completely outcomesfocused. It may also bring about discussion that paying for the Malcolm Baldrige Quality
Award is a marketing tactic and does not have strong implications to better quality in
those that have received the award. While there is no cost initially for the Healthgrades
award, should the hospital want to market or publicize receiving the distinction, the
hospital would have to pay for that licensing.
Discussion
The findings of this research and the findings of the additional analysis of the
Malcolm Baldrige and Healthgrades awards begs the question of where will resources
best be spent in terms of quality improvement. Should hospitals invest resources, time,
effort, and money into obtaining and marketing these awards? If we examine the findings
as they align to the areas that we have identified as the most costly for hospitals to
endure, the OB-GYN, OD, and ED, we see that overall two out of four variables assigned
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to these areas are depicting a statistically significant difference in performances in a
better way between national quality award-winning hospitals and non-national quality
award-winning hospitals. Yet when a further examination between the kinds of national
awards received is conducted, we find that for Malcolm Baldrige winners none of the
variables assigned to these high-risk areas are statistically different in performance than
hospitals that have not won the Malcolm Baldrige Award. For the Healthgrades
Distinguished Hospital for Clinical Excellence Award winners, we find that two out of
the four variables assigned to the high-risk areas are statistically different in performance
in a better way than hospitals that have not received this Healthgrades Award. As we
discussed earlier, the ED metric for both overall award winners and for specific
Healthgrades winners indicated a statistically significant difference in performance;
however, it was the non-award-winning hospitals that performed better in this variable.
This actually may be an indication that award-winning hospitals are aligning with
principles of highly reliable organizations in a reluctance to simplify.
The answer to the question “Is it worth it for hospitals to invest resources into
obtaining and marketing these awards?” is maybe. For Malcolm Baldrige Award-winning
hospitals, they perform better on 27% of the variables selected for analysis. Conversely,
that means they do not perform better on 73% of the variables selected. For Healthgrades
Distinguished Hospital for Clinical Excellence Award winners, they perform better on
45% of the variables selected for analysis, which means they do not perform better on
55% of the variables selected. Looking specifically at the OB-GYN unit, the average
damages awarded in a successful lawsuit involving a neurologically impaired infant is
$1,150,687 (Shwayder, 2007). Is it worth the hundreds of hours of manpower, other
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resources and upwards of $50,000 in fees/site visit fees to go through the Malcolm
Baldrige Award process in order to reduce the opportunity for liability in obstetrics?
Possibly, but if the organization already performs at a high level in obstetrics, maybe not.
These two quality awards have opposite evaluation points. The Malcolm Baldrige starts
at the beginning, has upfront costs in fees, and a large hospital could easily spend over
$100,000 in resources of personnel and fees, including a site visit fee, in order to
participate in the assessment. For the Healthgrades Award, the start is at the outcomes
level, there is no upfront cost to the hospital, they have not invested personnel or fees to
be evaluated by Healthgrades, and all hospitals are calculated and ranked without a
request by the hospital. However, should their hospital perform at a level high enough to
receive an award, in order to market or publicize the honor, a licensing fee is required and
can be upwards of $145,000, according to Rau (2013).
Overall findings indicate there are some variables where the mean scores for the
non-national quality award-winning hospitals are considerably lower than national
quality award-winning hospitals. This indicates that there are some non-award-winning
hospitals performing very low and dragging the mean down. For those hospitals,
documentation of a continuous process improvement plan, assessment of that plan, and
initiatives for performance outcomes improvement as required by the Malcolm Baldrige
assessment may prove to be exceedingly beneficial in their journey to quality. The
answer to the question “Is it worth it?” depends on what the hospital needs: does it need a
diagnostic test equivalent to the Malcolm Baldrige, or does it need to publicize the fact
that it can handle high-risk obstetrics with low percentages of early deliveries.
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Limitations
Limitations to this study that must be acknowledged are as follows. First, the
variables selected from the Medicare Hospital Compare database are from the Timely and
Effective Care category. There were no risk-adjustment calculations done on these sets of
data to account for co-morbidities in patients or other systemic issues. The Medicare
database acknowledges only certain markers of quality which may or may not reflect
actual error rates.
Second, the variables selected were done so based on literature review and
identification by professional medical associations and societies in the United States.
Selection of different variables could yield different results and findings.
Third, the selection of variables to represent each high-risk area was done so
based on logic and necessity. For example, there is only one obstetrics metric in the
Medicare Hospital Compare database for timely and effective care; therefore, that
variable was used. For the Operating Department, the variables that could be directly
attributed to that department were used, and others where the Operating Department was
merely a step in the process were not linked to them. For example, blood glucose levels
being monitored or urinary catheters being removed—those are variables that occurred in
and around the operating room; however, compliance with them would happen on the
medical/recovery floor, not necessarily in the operating room. For the Emergency
Department, the average number of minutes may or may not be a direct reflection of the
Emergency Department. Instead, it could be a reflection of a systemic hospital issue that
manifested itself as wait time in the Emergency Department. A different variable
representation of the high-risk departments may yield different results and findings.
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Fourth, there may be other databases with which to examine quality in healthcare
other than the Medicare Hospital Compare database, such as LeapFrog or the
Healthgrades database.
Finally, there may be other awards that represent a national quality component
and would be appropriate to use in an examination of quality in hospitals, such as those
from the National Committee for Quality Assurance or the American Health Care
Association.
Implications for Policy, Practice, and Organization
The results of this study provide a number of implications for policy, practice, and
organization. First, for patients: this study suggests that national quality award-winning
hospitals do perform at a higher level in specific clinical care variables than non-national
quality award-winning hospitals. Patients can use this information to look for hospitals
that have won a national quality award.
Second, for hospitals: this study suggests that hospitals that have received a
national quality award have better outcome performance in specific clinical care
variables. Hospitals that have not received a national quality award may look to these
findings and to these hospitals to better understand how they have achieved these
outcomes, as they can use these hospitals as benchmarks of quality. The mapping of
components of the Malcolm Baldrige and Healthgrades Awards to characteristics of
highly reliable organizations can be useful to hospitals as well, as a starting point on their
quality journey. However, as hospitals move down the path of quality, they should strive
to examine their own data, their own trends, and their own performances as part of a
continuous quality improvement plan that exists in highly reliable organizations.
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Finally, for public administrators and policy makers: without question legislation
and government influence is one aspect that can shape the culture of an industry and
organization. The most recent legislation, the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, was a combination of access to healthcare care and quality improvement of
healthcare. It focused on mandating insurance coverage for all people, but it also included
a number of programs and agencies developed for improving quality and performance as
well as prevention and wellness (U.S. DHHS, 2014). This legislative influence on
healthcare finally focuses on the quality and safety of the delivery of healthcare. The
Affordable Care Act combines the use of financial incentives as well as penalties to
promote a coordination of quality care for patients (Kocher & Adashi, 2011). These
policies represent the first national efforts to tie reimbursement directly to hospital
performance (McHugh et al., 2011). The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
emphasize quality in a number of ways and is a strong federal regulatory push toward the
goal of “flawless execution” (Furrow, 2011, p. 1732).
The findings of this study suggest that hospitals receiving national quality awards
perform better in specific clinical outcomes than those hospitals that do not, which could
help public administrators in the evaluation of quality in healthcare. In addition, public
administrators and government units can create a forum of best practices, where national
award-winning hospitals can provide insights and lessons learned for hospitals striving to
achieve quality could be an incredible resource in the movement forward of patient safety
and quality.
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Implications for Future Research
Future work should include more quality variables and a re-examination of highrisk departments, specifically the Emergency Department. With the inclusion of more
variables, a stronger difference between the performance outcomes and the national
quality award-winning categories can be established, providing a better understanding of
whether receiving a national quality award really means better quality in performance
outcomes across a larger spectrum. A re-examination of the variables representing highrisk departments may provide a stronger difference as well and may provide better insight
for individual departments looking to improve quality.
Future work should include a broader definition of quality to better understand the
difference between error rates and quality, as well as identification of other awards that
could represent quality at a national level.
Also, while the current findings indicate there is a statistically significant
difference in the performance outcomes of a number of specific variables between
national quality award-winning hospitals and non-national quality award-winning
hospitals, the findings do not delve into why that is occurring. Follow-up qualitative
research in these national quality award-winning hospitals may yield interesting findings
and best practices that could help non-national quality award-winning hospitals improve
performance outcomes.
Conclusions
Arguably hospitals that have received national quality awards can be said to be
reflective of highly reliable organizations, in their sensitivity to operations, reluctance to
simplify, and their preoccupation with failure. The findings of the Mann–Whitney U test
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performed in this study indicate for more variables than not, there is a better statistically
significant difference in performance outcomes for national award-winning hospitals
compared to non-national award-winning hospitals. Variables linked to OB Departments
and Operating Departments in national award-winning hospitals indicate better
statistically significant differences in performance outcomes in early delivery and timing
of antibiotics, and no statistically significant difference in kind of antibiotics. While time
spent in Emergency Departments is higher (a lower performance) in national quality
award-winning hospitals than non-national quality award-winning hospitals at a
statistically significant level, that finding may still reflect elements of highly reliable
organizations, in that those EDs that have higher times are showing a reluctance to
simplify in order to gain a better more detailed sketch of the situation. However, in
looking at the logical question of whether or not it is worth it for hospitals to pursue,
obtain, and market these national quality awards, the answer is a resounding maybe.
Some hospitals, those that are performing considerably lower than their quality awardwinning peers, may benefit from the forced self-examination that going through the
process of achieving a Malcolm Baldrige Award would require. However, those hospitals
that are already performing to the same standard as a national quality award-winning
hospital may find utilizing those resources would be better spent on other quality
initiatives.
I will refrain from suggesting that either one of these awards is not worth the cost,
because first, in this research the cost is really unknown. While the fees for the Malcolm
Baldrige Award are upwards of $50,000, the man hours and resources expended by the
hospital in preparing the application and setting into motion the assessment can be
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staggering. Compared to Healthgrades, where there is no upfront cost to be evaluated on
the hospital’s performance, should they want to publicize any awards received, then
comes a cost that can be as high as $145,000 depending on how and where the hospital
markets and publicizes the award (Rau, 2013). But secondly, I refrain from saying these
awards are not worth the cost because I believe that any initiative that focuses on quality
performance for healthcare is a worthy endeavor. However, I would propose instead to
not ask the question whether pursuing the Malcolm Baldrige or Healthgrades Awards are
worth the cost, but instead ask what is it the hospital can do to move toward becoming a
highly reliable organization? By virtue of this research and other work by Pope (2015),
we see that those hospitals that have received national quality awards are functioning
more closely and adhering more consistently with principles of highly reliable
organizations, and that should be the goal. It is not the pursuit of the award that should be
the focus for the hospitals, but instead pursuit of the principles of highly reliable
organizations, and with that journey will come the quality performance outcomes worthy
of national awards.
Implications of these findings can provide patients with better information on
which hospitals to search for in regard to quality care, and can provide hospitals with
information on possibly where to allocate resources for quality improvement initiatives,
as well as a mapping tool for how the indicators of quality for the Malcolm Baldrige
Award and Healthgrades Award can reflect highly reliable organizations.
Finally, the findings can provide public administrators and policy makers with
information on using national quality awards as actual indicators of quality as they
evaluate programs and government initiatives of quality. With the legislative focus, first,

129
on understanding disease; second, on access to care; and, third, on safety and quality, a
culture was established in the healthcare industry that rewarded research into the disease
processes and providing access to care for people, not necessarily for quality and safety,
until very recently. What has resulted is an industry culture that has created punitive
environments and is shrouded in secrecy. If a mistake in healthcare is made, it needs to be
covered up. If it is not covered up, then blame must be assigned, shame must be dealt,
and the individual is the problem. Legislation or government awareness can shape the
culture of an industry and organization, and healthcare is no exception. Legislators with
the power to finance healthcare research and to create policies that focus on the good of
the public as a whole will guide the healthcare culture (Moses et al., 2013).
Future work should focus on broadening the number of variables examined, and a
re-examination of the variables that are allocated to high-risk departments, in order to
better understand if national quality awards equate to actual quality in several
performance outcomes variables. Finally, future work should also include qualitative
studies to better understand how and why these national quality award-winning hospitals
have performance outcomes that are better than non-national award-winning hospitals.
The science is not yet there to definitively call for public administrators and
policy makers to endorse, require, or reward hospitals that have obtained these national
quality awards. There is much more work to be done in the investigation of the science of
evaluating hospital performance.
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List of Serious Reporting Events, previously known as “never events”
(http://www.qualityforum.org/Topics/SREs/List_of_SREs.aspx)
1. SURGICAL OR INVASIVE PROCEDURE EVENTS
1A. Surgery or other invasive procedure performed on the wrong site
1B. Surgery or other invasive procedure performed on the wrong patient
1C. Wrong surgical or other invasive procedure performed on a patient
1D. Unintended retention of a foreign object in a patient after surgery or other invasive
procedure
1E. Intraoperative or immediately postoperative/postprocedure death in an ASA Class 1
patient
2. PRODUCT OR DEVICE EVENTS
2A. Patient death or serious injury associated with the use of contaminated drugs, devices,
or biologics provided by the healthcare setting
2B. Patient death or serious injury associated with the use or function of a device in
patient care, in which the device is used or functions other than as intended
2C. Patient death or serious injury associated with intravascular air embolism that occurs
while being cared for in a healthcare setting
3. PATIENT PROTECTION EVENTS
3A. Discharge or release of a patient/resident of any age, who is unable to make decisions,
to other than an authorized person
3B. Patient death or serious injury associated with patient elopement (disappearance)
3C. Patient suicide, attempted suicide, or self-harm that results in serious injury, while
being cared for in a healthcare setting
4. CARE MANAGEMENT EVENTS
4A. Patient death or serious injury associated with a medication error (e.g., errors
involving the wrong drug, wrong dose, wrong patient, wrong time, wrong rate, wrong
preparation, or wrong route of administration)
4B. Patient death or serious injury associated with unsafe administration of blood products
4C. Maternal death or serious injury associated with labor or delivery in a low-risk
pregnancy while being cared for in a healthcare setting
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4D. Death or serious injury of a neonate associated with labor or delivery in a low-risk
pregnancy
4E. Patient death or serious injury associated with a fall while being cared for in a
healthcare setting
4F. Any Stage 3, Stage 4, and unstageable pressure ulcers acquired after
admission/presentation to a healthcare setting
4G. Artificial insemination with the wrong donor sperm or wrong egg
4H. Patient death or serious injury resulting from the irretrievable loss of an irreplaceable
biological specimen
4I. Patient death or serious injury resulting from failure to follow up or communicate
laboratory, pathology, or radiology test results
5. ENVIRONMENTAL EVENTS
5A. Patient or staff death or serious injury associated with an electric shock in the course
of a patient care process in a healthcare setting
5B. Any incident in which systems designated for oxygen or other gas to be delivered to a
patient contains no gas, the wrong gas, or are contaminated by toxic substances
5C. Patient or staff death or serious injury associated with a burn incurred from any
source in the course of a patient care process in a healthcare setting
5D. Patient death or serious injury associated with the use of physical restraints or bedrails
while being cared for in a healthcare setting
6. RADIOLOGIC EVENTS
6A. Death or serious injury of a patient or staff associated with the introduction of a
metallic object into the MRI area
7. POTENTIAL CRIMINAL EVENTS
7A. Any instance of care ordered by or provided by someone impersonating a physician,
nurse, pharmacist, or other licensed healthcare provider
7B. Abduction of a patient/resident of any age
7C. Sexual abuse/assault on a patient or staff member within or on the grounds of a
healthcare setting

7D. Death or serious injury of a patient or staff member resulting from a physical
assault (i.e., battery) that occurs within or on the grounds of a healthcare setting
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Healthgrades Overall and Specialty Excellence Awards

Overall Excellence Awards

Specialty Excellence Awards

-

America’s 50 Best Hospitals – These
hospitals are recognized as the top 1% in
the nation for consistent clinical quality
based on risk-adjusted mortality and
complication rates year after year.

-

Bariatric Surgery Excellence Award
Cardiac Care Excellence Award
Critical Care Excellence Award
Coronary Intervention Excellence Award

-

America’s 100 Best Hospitals – These
hospitals are recognized as the top 2% in
the nation for consistent clinical quality
year after year.

-

Gastrointestinal Care Excellence Award
Gastrointestinal Surgery Excellence Award
General Surgery Excellence Award
Gynecologic Surgery Excellence Award

-

Patient Safety Excellence Award – These
hospitals are in the top 10% in the nation
for preventing infections, medical errors
and other complications based on 14
standard patient safety indicators.

-

Heart Transplant Excellence Award
Joint Replacement Excellence Award
Kidney Transplant Excellence Award
Liver Transplant Excellence Award

-

Distinguished Hospitals for Clinical
Excellence Award – These hospitals are in
the top 5% nationally for overall clinical
excellence. They exhibit comprehensive
and consistent quality across several
medical specialties based on risk-adjusted
mortality and complication rates.

-

Lung Transplant Excellence Award
Maternity Care Excellence Award
Neurosciences Excellence Award
Neurosurgery Excellence Award

-

Emergency Medicine Excellence Award –
These hospitals have emergency
departments in the top 5% nationally for
patients admitted to the hospital after being
treated in the emergency department.

-

Orthopedic Surgery Excellence Award
Prostatectomy Excellence Award
Pulmonary Care Excellence Award
Spine Surgery Excellence Award

-

Pediatric Patient Safety Excellence Award –
These hospitals are in the top 10% in the
nation for pediatric patient safety,
preventing infections, medical errors and
other complications in children based on 8
standard patient safety indicators. (Pediatric
variables are not part of the study, because
the focus has been on adult care, however it
is included in this listing because it is an
“award” that any one of the participating
hospitals could have received.

-

Stroke Care Excellence Award
Vascular Surgery Excellence Award
Women’s Health Excellence Award
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Data Collection Sheet

Subject

ST

WINNER MB

HDHCE EKG_Min PCI_%

ACE_% PN_ANTI_% RT_ANTI_% RT_KIND_%
BS_CONT_% CATH_TIME% ER_TIME_MIN CLOT_% OB_%

Appendix D
Human Subjects Institutional Review Board Approval
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Data Analysis Informational Charts by Variable

Group Statistics
Award
PCI

ED1

ACEI

ECG

Anti_Time

Anti_Kind

OB

PNEU

Sugar

Urine

Clots

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

Std. Error Mean

.0

1145

95.50

5.992

.177

1.0

353

95.78

6.979

.371

.0

2626

277.35

89.107

1.739

1.0

419

299.30

73.943

3.612

.0

2114

96.57

6.041

.131

1.0

414

97.80

3.439

.169

.0

1571

7.85

5.356

.135

1.0

129

7.84

5.153

.454

.0

2358

96.75

5.641

.116

1.0

399

97.89

2.699

.135

.0

2612

97.00

5.630

.110

1.0

419

97.91

2.972

.145

.0

2065

5.09

7.169

.158

1.0

371

3.46

4.620

.240

.0

2643

95.84

5.429

.106

1.0

420

97.36

2.672

.130

.0

738

93.92

7.101

.261

1.0

281

94.91

5.962

.356

.0

2557

96.79

5.397

.107

1.0

420

97.97

2.885

.141

.0

2660

98.03

3.829

.074

1.0

420

98.96

1.231

.060
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Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for
Equality of
Variances

t-test for Equality of Means
95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference

F
PCI

Equal variances
assumed

.294

Sig.
.588

Equal variances
not assumed
ED1

Equal variances
assumed

7.139

.008

Equal variances
not assumed
ACEI

Equal variances
assumed

41.442

.000

Equal variances
not assumed
ECG

Equal variances
assumed

.077

.782

Equal variances
not assumed
Anti_

Equal variances

Time

assumed

35.883

.000

Equal variances
not assumed
Anti_

Equal variances

Kind

assumed

24.521

.000

Equal variances
not assumed
OB

Equal variances
assumed

30.400

.000

Equal variances
not assumed
PNEU

Equal variances
assumed

46.076

.000

Equal variances
not assumed
Sugar

Equal variances
assumed

9.258

.002

Equal variances
not assumed
Urine

Equal variances
assumed

41.563

.000

Equal variances
not assumed
Clots

Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed

43.387

.000

t

df

Sig. (2-

Mean

Std. Error

tailed)

Difference

Difference

Lower

Upper

-.737

1496

.461

-.280

.380

-1.025

.465

-.680

521.843

.497

-.280

.412

-1.088

.529

-4.786

3043

.000

-21.950

4.586

-30.942

-12.957

-5.475

628.778

.000

-21.950

4.009

-29.823

-14.077

-4.030

2526

.000

-1.234

.306

-1.834

-.633

-5.763

992.033

.000

-1.234

.214

-1.654

-.814

.018

1698

.986

.009

.489

-.951

.968

.018

151.617

.985

.009

.473

-.927

.944

-3.975

2755

.000

-1.144

.288

-1.709

-.580

-6.422

1102.296

.000

-1.144

.178

-1.494

-.795

-3.263

3029

.001

-.918

.281

-1.469

-.366

-5.035

985.714

.000

-.918

.182

-1.275

-.560

4.215

2434

.000

1.626

.386

.870

2.383

5.666

734.766

.000

1.626

.287

1.063

2.190

-5.615

3061

.000

-1.516

.270

-2.045

-.987

-9.035

1075.455

.000

-1.516

.168

-1.845

-1.187

-2.079

1017

.038

-.992

.477

-1.928

-.056

-2.247

597.951

.025

-.992

.441

-1.859

-.125

-4.354

2975

.000

-1.173

.269

-1.702

-.645

-6.641

985.690

.000

-1.173

.177

-1.520

-.826

-4.950

3078

.000

-.933

.188

-1.302

-.563

-9.764

1956.479

.000

-.933

.096

-1.120

-.745
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